EVIDENCE-ScIENTIFIc

TESTIMONY-EPIDEMIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE
MAY BE USED TO ESTABLISH CAUSATION IN Toxic TORT LITIGATION PROVIDED THAT THE APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF ADMISSI-

MET-Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 127 NJ. 404, 605
A.2d 1079 (1992).'
BILrlY ARE

To establish a claim of negligence, a toxic tort plaintiff, like
any other tort plaintiff, must prove that the defendant breached a
duty of reasonable care and that the breach proximately caused
actual loss or damage to the plaintiff.2 In the past, tort plaintiffs
relied largely upon expert testimony to establish the requisite
causal connection between a defendant's conduct and a plaintiff's
1 At the time Landriganwas decided, the original 1967 version of the New Jersey
Rules of Evidence were in effect. Contemporaneously, however, the state legislature
had considered and adopted, effective July 1, 1993, an amended version of the New
Jersey Rules of Evidence designed to achieve greater uniformity with the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Whenever a NewJersey Rule of Evidence is cited in this Note, the
former text of the rule will be immediately followed by the text of the newly enacted
rule. The former rules will be cited as "N.J. Evid. 1,." whereas the newly adopted rules
will be cited as "NJ.R.E." See N.J.R.E. 1103, RicHARD J. Bnmmo, CuRRENr NEwJERSEY
RuLEs OF EVIDENCE (1993-94).
2 See WILLAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERLALS ON TORTS 136 (8th ed.
1988). Section 4 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
The word "duty" is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to
denote the fact that the actor is required to conduct himself in a particular manner at the risk that if he does not do so he becomes subject to
liability to another to whom the duty is owed for any injury sustained by
such other, of which that actor's conduct is a legal cause.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 (1966).

Additionally, section 9 of the Restate-

ment (Second) of Torts provides:
The words "legal cause" are used throughout the Restatement of this
Subject to denote the fact that the causal sequence by which the actor's
tortious conduct has resulted in an invasion of some legally protected
interest of another is such that the law holds the actor responsible for
such harm unless there is some defense to liability.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 9 (1966). See generaUy 86 C.J.S. Torts §§ 6 (duty),
13 (breach), 21 (damages), 27 (proximate cause) (1954). See also Dawson v. Chrysler
Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 956 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981) (stating that
New Jersey law will not hold a defendant liable in tort unless he owes the plaintiff a
duty of care); Pennsylvania Nat'l Turf Club, Inc. v. Bank of West Jersey, 158 NJ.
Super. 196, 203, 385 A.2d 932, 936 (App. Div. 1978) (stating that to be liable in tort a
defendant must owe a duty to the plaintiff); Caputzal v. The Lindsay Co., 48 NJ. 69,
74, 222 A.2d 513, 516 (1966) (explaining that the elements of a claim for negligence
are duty, breach, proximate cause and damages); Dalton v. Gesser, 72 N.J. Super. 100,
112, 178 A.2d 64, 71 (App. Div. 1962) (articulating that a tortfeasor is liable only for
the damages proximately caused by his unlawful conduct); Pyle v. Fidelity Philadelphia Trust Co., 18 NJ. Misc. 54, 56, 10 A.2d 482, 484 (Atlantic County Ct. 1940)
(asserting that a plaintiff's injury "must be predicated upon the violation, neglect or
omission" of a defendant's legal duty).
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injury.' Proof of causation in toxic tort litigation, however,
presents a unique problem.4 Because the symptoms of a toxic tort
§ 2, at 3 (John William
Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (stating that "[a]part from the ordinary eyewitnesses, it is
increasingly necessary to arrange for the employment of technical experts, such as
physicians in personal injury cases"). See generally 32 C.J.S. Evidence §§ 546(60) to
546(127), at 257-501 (1964) (discussing the function of skilled observers and experts
and the subjects on which they testify); William E. Pipkin,Jr., Expert Opinion Testimony:
Experts, Where Did They Come From and Why Are They Here?, 13 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv. 103
(1989) (providing an overview of the role that experts play in the litigation process).
For a detailed discussion of the abuse of expert testimony in the legal system and
safeguards within NewJersey law to prevent this abuse, see Barry M. Epstein & Marc S.
Klein, The Use And Abuse Of Expert Testimony In ProductLiability Actions, 17 SETON HALL
L. REV. 656, 664-74 (1987).
Prior to the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 704, expert testimony addressing proximate cause was inadmissible, as a matter of law, because proximate cause is
an ultimate issue. Daniel J. Steinbock, et al., Expert Testimony on Proximate Cause, 38
DEF. L.J. 539, 545 (1989). Expert opinion testimony pertaining to proximate cause
was routinely excluded because it invaded the function of the fact-finder. Id. at 54546. Recognizing that a jury could always chose to disregard an expert's testimony
about proximate cause, however, courts began to systematically reject the ultimate
issue rule. Id. at 546. In 1974, Federal Rule of Evidence 704 officially abolished the
prohibition on ultimate issue testimony, thereby allowing experts to testify on proximate cause. Id. Nonetheless, the prohibition on ultimate issue testimony had merit.
Id. at 562. Because proximate cause is a legal term of art, people outside the legal
profession may not fully comprehend its meaning. Id. at 541-42. For instance, an
expert may be well-equipped, by virtue of his specialized knowledge or training, to
offer an opinion as to the cause-in-fact of an injury. Id. at 550. The expert, however,
may have no understanding of proximate cause as a legal concept and therefore may
lack any basis upon which to label an event the proximate cause of a particular injury.
Id. at 552-53.
4 Developments in the Law--Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1458, 1620
(1986) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]. See also Roy Alan Cohen & Jodi F.
Mindnich, Expert Testimony And The Presentation Of Scientific Evidence In Toxic Tort And
EnvironmentalHazardous SubstanceLitigation, 21 SETON HALL L. REv. 1009, 1010 (1991)
(noting that the complex nature of toxic tort and environmental hazardous substance
litigation requires attorneys to employ various specialized experts on science and
medicine); Steve Cold, Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof Standards of
Persuasion, and StatisticalEvidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 376 (1986) (acknowledging that
toxic tort litigation poses unique judicial challenges, especially in establishing
causation).
The New Jersey court system has devoted considerable attention to cases involving the level of proof required to establish an enhanced risk of developing a future
injury due to toxic exposure. Mauro v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 116 N.J. 126, 128,
561 A.2d 257, 258 (1989); Ayers v. Jackson Township, 106 N.J. 557, 577-79, 525 A.2d
287, 297-98 (1987). In Mauro v. Raymark Industries, Inc., the plaintiff suffered pleural
thickening as the result of occupational exposure to asbestos. Mauro, 116 N.J. at 12830, 561 A.2d at 258-59. The plaintiff sued based upon his already diagnosed injury,
the increased risk of developing cancer and the emotional distress created by that
increased risk. Id. at 131, 561 A.2d at 259-60. The court recognized the plaintiff's
right to recover damages for the initial physical injury and for any attendant emotional distress. Id. at 137, 561 A.2d at 263 (citing Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 202
N.J. Super. 556, 560-64, 495 A.2d 495, 497-99 (Law Div. 1985)). Further, the court
3 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE
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injury may remain latent and undiagnosed for years, ascertainment
of the injury's origin seldom lends itself to traditional methods of
proof.5 Moreover, it can be exceedingly difficult to establish a direct line of causation between a defendant's conduct and a plaintiff's injury because many people contract diseases, such as cancer,
from non-tort related circumstances. 6 As a result, plaintiffs have
come to rely upon the testimony of scientific and medical experts
who proffer evidence that is more sophisticated, but less particularized.7 In other words, a plaintiff who is unable to prove causation
acknowledged the plaintiffs ability to recover medical-surveillance damages, i.e., specific monetary damages measured by the cost of periodic medical examinations necessitated by the toxic exposure. Id. at 136-37, 561 A.2d at 263 (citing Ayers, 106 NJ. at
606, 525 A.2d at 312-13). The Mauro court, however, declined to determine whether
a plaintiff not immediately injured by toxic exposure could recover emotional distress
damages based on a rational fear of future injury. Id. at 137, 561 A.2d at 263. With
regard to the enhanced risk claim, the court held that damages were not available
unless the prospective disease was reasonably certain to occur. Id. at 139, 561 A.2d at
264. The majority noted that courts throughout the country have adopted this reasonable probability standard. Id. at 139-41, 561 A.2d at 264-65 (citing Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1204 (6th Cir. 1988); Pollock v.Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 686 F. Supp. 489, 492 (D.NJ. 1988); Sorenson v. Raymark Industries,
Inc., 756 P.2d 740, 742 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988); DeStories v. City of Pheonix, 744 P.2d
705, 707 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp.
1516, 1524 (W.D. Mich. 1987); Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219,
1231 (D. Mass. 1986); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 412 (5th
Cir. 1986); Larson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Mich. 1986); Hagerty v. L. & L. Marine Services, Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319, modified on other grounds, 797
F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986); Herber v.Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 81-82 (3d Cir.
1986); Deulin, 202 NJ. Super. at 565, 495 A.2d at 500; Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox,
481 So. 2d 517, 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
761 F.2d 1129, 1137 (5th Cir. 1985); Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d
111, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). For example, the Mauro court explained:
[TIhe personal-injury plaintiff [with a bruised knee] conceivably could
claim medical-surveillance damages and emotional-distress damages on
the basis that the knee injury might cause arthritis, but could not recover damages for the prospective arthritic condition-for the "enhanced risk" of arthritis-unless its occurrence was established as a
matter of reasonable medical probability.
Id. at 138, 561 A.2d at 264 (citing Coll v. Sherry, 29 N.J. 166, 174-75, 148 A.2d 481,
485-86 (1959)). Because the plaintiffs proof of the prospective development of cancer did not rise to the level of reasonable medical probability, the Mauro court held,
the trial judge correctly withheld the plaintiffs enhanced-risk claim from the jury. Id.
at 139, 561 A.2d at 264.
5 Gold, supra note 4, at 376; see also Deuelopments in the Law, supra note 4, at 1618
(suggesting that toxic tort injuries do not lend themselves to particularized forms of
proof).
6 See Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, EpidemiologicProofIn Toxic Tort Litigation,52
FORDHAM L. Rxv. 732, 740 (1984).
7 Michael Dore, A Commentary On The Use Of EpidemiologicalEvidence In Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact 7 HAiv. ENvrL. L. REv. 429, 430 (1983). See also Gold, supra note 4,
at 377 (observing that courts have increasingly allowed litigants to rely on epidemiol-
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directly must establish it inferentially.' This causal inference is created by demonstrating that the plaintiff falls within a class of people likely to have contracted a particular disease as a result of
exposure to a toxic substance. 9
The primary source of this type of evidence is epidemiology. 10
Epidemiology studies the relationship between a disease and its
causative factors." An epidemiologist's analysis compares the inciogy to establish causation). See, e.g., In reAgent Orange, 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1239-40
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), affld, 818 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub. nom. Lombardi v.
Dow Chemical Co., 487 U.S. 1234 (1987) (noting that courts have begun to overcome
their aversion to epidemiological evidence as a less particularized form of proof); In re
Swine Flu Immunization Products Liability Litigation, 508 F. Supp. 897, 907 (D. Colo.
1981) (stating that "[w]here... the exact organic cause of a disease cannot be scientifically located, epidemiologic data becomes highly persuasive").
For a discussion of the types of scientific and medical experts toxic tort litigants
typically utilize, see Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4, at 1034-40.
8 See Dore, supra note 7, at 436.
9 Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 6, at 750.
10 Id. at 736. See also Richard J. Heafey, Trial by Lottery: The Misuse of Epidemiology
and Statistics to Prove Causation in Drug And Chemical Litigation,38 DEF. Lj. 673, 682-92
(1989) (analyzing the limits of statistical hypotheses based on epidemiology). For a
thorough overview of epidemiology's role in the litigation process, see Cohen &
Mindnich, supra note 4 and Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 6.
11 Cohen & Mindnich, supranote 4, at 1035. There are three general categories of
epidemiology "(1) descriptive epidemiology; (2) analytic epidemiology-, and (3) experimental epidemiology." 13 ARTHuR L. FnAxx, M.D., PH.D, CouRTRooM MEDiCINE,
Cancer§ 3B.01 (Matthew Bender 1990) [hereinafter COuRTROOM MEDicINE]. With regard to these categories, Dr. Frank explained:
Descriptive epidemiology refers to the study of the occurrence of
disease in human populations based on the relationship between disease presentation and characteristics of the study population. These
characteristics include age, sex, race, occupation, social class and in
some studies geographical distribution.
... After making descriptive observations of the possible relationships between exposure and development of disease, one generally
moves on to analytic studies of the problem. Analytic studies are used
either to test certain hypotheses generated by descriptive studies, or to
answer a specific question (or questions) regarding the cause-and-effect
relationship of exposure and disease. There are three types of general
analytic studies, each of which has its usefulness in cancer
epidemiology.
- . . (1)
Cross-sectional studies (also called surveys or prevalence
studies) consider a number of variables in a defined population at a
specific point in time.
...
(2) The case-control study is a relatively simple methodology
that is especially useful for studying uncommon problems. One begins
this type of study by identifying those individuals with the disease, i.e.,
the cases. One then looks to match these individuals to similar persons
who do not have the disease, i.e., controls.
...
(3) A cohort study (sometimes called an incidence study) dif-

19931

NOTE

451

dence of a disease in a population exposed to a potential causative
agent with the incidence of the disease in an unexposed population. 1 2 The epidemiologist's ultimate goal is to reduce the observed data to a statistical inference that measures the strength of
the causal association within the general population.' 3 The toxic
tort plaintiff may then utilize the statistical correlation to establish
the requisite causal link between the plaintiff's injury and the de14
fendant's conduct.
To accommodate the evolving needs of toxic tort plaintiffs,
the New Jersey Supreme Court has been engaged in a decade-long,
continual modification of the standard for admitting scientific evidence.1 5 Consistent with this trend, the supreme court held, in
Landriganv. Celotex, 6 that epidemiological evidence can be utilized
fers from surveys and case control studies in that it directly examines
factors related to the development of disease. One begins a cohort study
with populations free of the disease and divides them into two groups.
One group is exposed to the presumed carcinogen, the other is not,
and development of the disease is observed over time in both groups.
The experimental study differs from other epidemiological
studies insofar as it permits direct manipulation of study populations
and exposures and control over details such as study methodology and
design.
Id. at §§ 3B.02-3B.04. For a more thorough discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of each of these studies, see id. at §§ 3B.01-3B.40.
12 Black & Lilienfeld, supranote 6, at 750; Heafey, supra note 10, at 674; Cohen &
Mindnich, supra note 4, at 1035. To accumulate data, epidemiologists conduct studies that are both retrospective and prospective in nature. Cohen & Mindnich, supra
note 4, at 1035. In the retrospective study, an epidemiologist compares a group,
whose members already demonstrate symptoms of a disease, to an unaffected control
group in an attempt to discover a common factor that explains the disease's occurrence. Id. The prospective study monitors, over a particular time span, both an exposed and an unexposed control group, observing the incidence of disease in each.
Id.
13 Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 6, at 750-51. Toxic tort litigants use epidemiological studies to prove that the development of a disease is statistically related to exposure to a toxic substance. Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4, at 1035. A statistical
inference arises by comparing the "expected mortality" rate (the disease mortality
rate of the group unexposed to the toxic substance) with the "observed mortality" rate
(the disease mortality rate of the group exposed to the toxic substance). Id. If these
mortality rates relate in a one to one ratio, then the "relative risk" is 1.0. Id. When
the "relative risk" is 1.0, the "attributable risk" is zero. Id. When the "relative risk" is
2.0, the "attributable risk" is greater than fifty percent. Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 127
N.J. 404, 419, 605 A.2d 1079, 1087 (1992).
14 Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 6, at 736; Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4, at
1014.
15 Landrigan, 127 N.J. at 412-13, 605 A.2d at 1083 (citing Rubanick v. Witco, 125
N.J. 421, 593 A.2d 733 (1991); Ryan v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 121 N.J. 276, 579 A.2d
1241 (1990)).
16 127 N.J. 404, 605 A.2d 1079 (1992). On the same day that Landriganwas de-
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to establish causation, provided that the evidence meets the applicable standards of admissibility. 17 With regard to the standard of
admissibility, the court explained that a trial judge should evaluate
the reasonableness of the methodology employed by an epidemiological expert on a case-by-case basis. 8
Thomas Landrigan died of colon cancer 9 after a twenty-five
cided, the NewJersey Supreme Court delivered an opinion in Caterinicchiov. Pittsburgh
Corning Corp. Caterinicchio v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 127 N.J. 428, 431, 605 A.2d
1092, 1093 (1992). In Caterinicchio,a former pipefitter, insulator and line mechanic
employed by the Exxon Bayway Refinery sued the manufacturers of the asbestos products that he had worked with for sixteen years. Id. The plaintiff, Peter Caterinicchio,
was diagnosed with colon cancer in 1985. Id. At trial, the plaintiff presented two
expert witnesses to testify that his colon cancer was caused by asbestos exposure. Id. at
432, 605 A.2d at 1093-94. One of the experts was a board certified physician in pulmonary and internal medicine. Id., 605 A.2d at 1093. The other expert was an industrial
epidemiologist and hygenist. Id. Both witnesses relied on the same epidemiological
data as the expert witnesses in Landrigan, i.e., Irving Selikoff's landmark study. See id.;
see also Landrigan, 127 N.J. at 418, 605 A.2d at 1086. As in Landrigan, the lower courts
held that the epidemiologic testimony of both the medical doctor and the epidemiologist was inadmissible. Caterinicchio,127 N.J. at 433-34, 605 A.2d at 1094; Landrigan,
127 N.J. at 411-12, 605 A.2d at 1083. Justice Pollock, writing for the New Jersey
Supreme Court, reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court to be evaluated
in accordance with the Landriganstandard. Gaterinicchio,127 N.J. at 434, 605 A.2d at
1095.
17 Landrigan, 127 N.J. at 417-18, 605 A.2d at 1086.
18 Id. at 421, 605 A.2d at 1088.
19 Colorectal cancer is one of the most prevalent cancers in the United States.
COURTROOM MEDICINE, supranote 11, at § 11.45. Studies have indicated that approximately five percent of Americans will contract colon cancer. Id. This figure translates
into roughly 100,000 new cases annually in the United States. Id. Although incidence
of the disease has remained fairly constant over the last forty years, the position of the
tumors has changed. Id. "Presently, approximately 75 per cent of large bowel carcinomas arise in the colon." Id.
Occurrence of the disease seems to have geographical implications. Id. Residents of the northeast are more likely to contract this form of cancer than Americans
in the southern and western portions of the nation. Id. Age is also a strong factor in
the development of colon cancer. Id. The disease occurs most frequently in the elderly, although individuals with a family history of the disease may be afflicted at a
younger age. Id. "Overall, the average age at diagnosis is in the late sixties." Id.
Epidemiological studies, primarily on animals, have revealed that many chemical
substances may produce colon cancer. Id. at § 11.44. None of these studies have,
however, produced conclusive results. Id. Researchers have identified only one inducing agent that bears a definite relation to the development of the disease-asbestos. Id. Specifically, researchers have explained that
[i] ndustrial exposure to asbestos has been shown to increase the risk of
developing colon cancer by some 2- or 3-fold. It is not clear if asbestos is
functioning as a cancer-causing agent in and of itself, or if it is interacting with other cancer-causing agents that normally cause cancer in the
colon. What is known, however, is that such exposure will lead to an
increased risk. No other such associations have been clearly made to
date.
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year career as a maintenance man and pipe insulator.2" Landrigan
spent the first sixteen of those twenty-five years working with insulation containing asbestos.2 After his death, Landrigan's widow
filed a survivorship and wrongful death action against the manufacturer and distributor 22 of the insulation, alleging that the years of
exposure to asbestos had caused the decedent's colon cancer.23
At trial, the plaintiff offered two expert witnesses, neither of
whom examined or treated the decedent, to establish the requisite
causal link between Landrigan's occupational exposure to asbestos
and his affliction with terminal colon cancer. 24 The first expert,
20 Landrigan, 127 NJ. at 410, 605 A.2d at 1082. See COURTROOM MEDxciNE, supra
note 11, at § 26.11 (listing "pipe insulator" among the occupations that spawn asbestos exposure).
21 Landrigan, 127 NJ. at 410, 605 A.2d at 1082.
22 In Landrigan, the defendants were Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corporation,
Owen Illinois, Inc. and The Celotex Corporation. Id. at 409, 605 A.2d at 1082. All
actions have been stayed against the Celotex Corporation, however, because the corporation has filed for bankruptcy. Id. Therefore, the Landrigancourt used the word
"defendants" in reference only to Owens Illinois, Inc. and Owens-Coming Fiberglass
Corporation. Id.
23 Id. at 410, 605 A.2d at 1082. The plaintiff had originally intended to pursue
both a strict liability and a negligence claim against the defendants. Id. In the strict
liability claim, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants failed to warn Landrigan, during his years of employment, of the potential health hazards presented by asbestos
exposure. Id. The basis of the plaintiff's negligence claim was that the defendants
had breached their duty of care by failing to inspect the decedent's workplace for
potential safety violations. Id. at 425, 605 A.2d at 1090. The trial court gave the plaintiff the option of proceeding under either the strict liability theory alone or "under a
combined strict liability and negligence theory." Id. at 410, 605 A.2d at 1082. If the
plaintiff chose to proceed on the strict liability theory, the defendants could not have
availed themselves of the state-of-the-art defense. Id. The state-of-the-art defense
would enable the defendants to claim ignorance of asbestos's dangerous side effects.
Id. If the plaintiff chose to proceed on the combined theory, however, the defendants
could avail themselves of the state-of-the-art defense. Id. The plaintiff elected to pursue the strict liability claim, thus precluding the defendants from utilizing the state-ofthe-art defense. Id. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the lower court's direction to
pursue only the strict liability theory. Id. at 423-24, 605 A.2d at 1089.
24 Id. at 410-11, 605 A.2d at 1082-83. Plaintiffs experts were Dr. Joseph Sokolowski, Jr., a board certified physician in pulmonary and internal medicine, and Dr. Joseph K. Wagoner, a biostatistician and epidemiologist. Id. Dr. Wagoner is a widely
recognized expert in asbestos-related diseases and has testified in a host of asbestosrelated litigation. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Gardner, 837 S.W.2d 224, 229 (Tex. CL
App. 1992) (testifying as to asbestos related disease); The Celotex Corp. v. Wilson, 607
A.2d 1223, 1226-27 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992) (testifying as to the risk of asbestos-related
cancer); Millison v, E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 226 N.J. Super. 572, 578, 545 A.2d 213,
216 (App. Div. 1988) (testifying as to asbestos-related pleural thickening in the lungs);
In reAsbestos Litigation, 1988 WL 77737, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. June 28, 1988) (testifying as to the prevalence of disease among workers exposed to asbestos); Brisboy v.
Fibreboard Corp., 418 N.W.2d 650, 652 (Mich. 1988) (testifying as to asbestos-related
lung cancer); Lee v. A.C. & S. Co., Inc., 542 A.2d 352, 353, 356 (Del. Super. Ct. 1987)
(barring Wagoner from testifying as to the cause of plaintiffs asbestos related death);
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Dr. Sokolowski, a certified physician, based his opinion primarily
upon epidemiological findings. 25 These findings indicated that
one out of every three victims of colon cancer previously exposed
to asbestos contracted the cancer because of that exposure. 26 After
considering and then eliminating other risk factors, Dr. Sokolowski
concluded that asbestos exposure was the cause of the decedent's
colon cancer.
Following a Rule 8 evidentiary hearing, 28 the court deterSteinfurth v. Armstrong World Indus., 500 N.E.2d 409, 410 (Ohio Com. P1. 1986)
(testifying as to the point at which a manufacturer has a duty to give adequate warning of the unsafe nature of its products to the foreseeable user).
At the time Landriganwas decided, New Jersey Rule of Evidence 19 set forth the
standard for assessing whether an expert was qualified to testify in courts of the state.
NJ. Evid. R. 19 (1967), RICHARD J. BuimNo, NEWJEtsEY RULES OF EVIDENCE (1993).
Rule 19 provided:
As a prerequisite for the testimony of a witness there must be evidence
that he has personal knowledge of the matter, or experience, training,
or education, if such be required. Such evidence may be provided by
the testimony of the witness himself. The judge may reject the testimony
of a witness that he perceived a matter if he finds that no trier of fact
could reasonably believe that the witness did perceive the matter. In
exceptional circumstances the judge may receive the testimony of the
witness conditionally, subject to the evidence of knowledge, experience,
training or education being later supplied in the course of the trial.
Id.
Rule 19 has been replaced by New Jersey Rule of Evidence 602, which states:
Except as otherwise provided by Rule 703 (bases of opinion testimony
by experts), a witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal
knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may,
but need not, consist of the testimony of the witness himself.
N.J.R.E. 602, Rica4IwJ. BiuNNo, CURRENT NEwJERsEY RULES OF EVIDENCE (1993-94).
With regard to expert testimony, the new text of the rule clearly refers the practitioner to Rule 703. REPORT OF THE SUPREME COURT COMMrrrEE ON THE RULES OF
EVIDENCE, reprinted in 129 N.J.L.J. 1, 23 (October 10, 1991) [hereinafter CommrrrEE
REPORT].

25 Landrigan, 127 NJ. at 410-11, 605 A.2d at 1082. Dr. Sokolowski based his opinion on the landmark study of Dr. Irving Selikoff. Id. at 418, 605 A.2d at 1086 (citing
Irving Selikoff et al., Mortality Experience of Insulation Workers in the United States and
Canada, 330 ANm-Is N.Y. Ac.A. Sci. 91 (1979)).
26 Id.

27 Id. at 411, 605 A.2d at 1082.
28 At the time Landriganwas decided, New Jersey Rule of Evidence 8(1) provided:
When the qualification of a person to be a witness, or the admissibility
of evidence, or the existence of a privilege is stated in these rules to be
subject to a condition, and the fulfillment of the condition is in issue,
that issue is to be determined by the judge. In his determination the
rules of evidence shall not apply except for Rule 4 or a valid claim of
privilege. The judge shall indicate to the parties which one has the burden of producing evidence and the burden of proof on such issue as
implied by the rule under which the question arises. The judge may
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mined that the second expert, Dr. Wagoner, an epidemiologist,
was not qualified to testify with regard to causation. 29 The court,
hear and determine such matters out of the presence or hearing of the
jury. This rule shall not be construed to limit the right of a party to
introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility.
NJ. Evid. R. 8(1).
Rule 8(1) has been replaced by New Jersey Rule of Evidence 104, which provides:
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. When the qualification of a
person to be a witness, or the admissibility of evidence, or the existence
of a privilege is subject to a condition, and the fulfillment of the condition is in issue, that issue is to be determined by the judge. In making
that determination the judge shall not apply the rules of evidence except for Rule 403 or a valid claim of privilege. The judge may hear and
determine such matters out of the presence or hearing of the jury.
(b) Relevance conditioned on fact. Where evidence is otherwise admissible if relevant and its relevance is subject to a condition, the judge
shall admit it upon or subject to the introduction of sufficient evidence
to support a finding of the condition. In such cases the judge shall
instruct the jury to consider the issue of the fulfillment of the condition
and to disregard the evidence if it finds that the condition was not fulfilled. The jury shall be instructed to disregard the evidence if the judge
subsequently determines that a jury could not reasonably find that the
condition was fulfilled.
(c) Preliminary hearings on admissibility of defendant's statements.
Where by virtue of any rule of law a judge is required in a criminal
action to make a preliminary determination as to the admissibility of a
statement by the defendant, the judge shall hear and determine the
question of its admissibility out of the presence of the jury. In such a
hearing the rules of evidence shall apply and the burden of persuasion
as to the admissibility of the statement is on the prosecution. If the
judge admits the statement the jury shall not be informed of the finding
that the statement is admissible but shall be instructed to disregard the
statement if it finds that it is not credible. If the judge subsequently
determines from all of the evidence that the statement is not admissible,
the judge shall take appropriate action.
(d) Testimony by accused By testifying upon a preliminary matter,
the accused does not become subject to cross-examination as to other
issues in the case.
(e) Weight and credibility. This rule does not limit the right of a
party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or
credibility.
NJ.R.E. 104.
In deciding evidentiary matters, an alternative to the Rule 8 procedure is the in
limine hearing. Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4, at 1022 n.42. The Third Circuit
asserted that "where there are numerous experts presenting voluminous testimony on
the cutting edge of scientific research, an in limine hearing may be a very useful tool in
conducting the inquiry, fact finding and balancing, which are the hallmarks of Rules
703 and 403 respectively." In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829, 859
(3d Cir. 1990). Certain New Jersey courts, however, preferred the Rule 8 hearing to
the in limine hearing. Cohen & Mindnich, supranote 4, at 1022 n.42 (citing Rubanick
v. Witco Chemical Corp., 242 NJ. Super. 36, 46, 576 A.2d 4, 9 (App. Div. 1990); Bellardini v. Krikorian, 222 N.J. Super. 457, 464, 537 A. 2d 700, 704 (App. Div. 1988)).
29 Landigan, 127 N.J. at 411, 605 A.2d at 1082-83.
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however, permitted Dr. Wagoner to proffer testimony relating to
the methods of epidemiology and to generalized epidemiological
findings linking asbestos to colon cancer.30
At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, the defendants moved for
a directed verdict."1 Upon considering the defendants' motion,
the trial judge determined that the plaintiff had failed to meet the
burden of proving causation. 2 In the court's estimation, Dr. Sokolowski's testimony was a net opinion,3" and Dr. Wagoner's limited
testimony offered no proof of causation. 4 The
trial court, there35
fore, granted the motion for directed verdict.
The appellate division affirmed the ruling of the lower court
with regard to the admissibility and value of the expert testimony.3 6
30 Id., 605 A.2d at 1083. The court allowed Dr. Wagoner to state his opinion "that
asbestos causes colon cancer in humans." Id. The trial court, however, would not
permit Dr. Wagoner to apply that opinion to Landrigan's factual scenario. Id.
31 Id. A motion for directed verdict is also referred to as a motion for judgment at
trial. See N.J. CT. R. 4:40-1. New Jersey Court Rule 4:40-1 provides:
A motion for judgment [at trial], stating specifically the grounds therefor, may be made by a party either at the close of all the evidence or at
the close of the evidence offered by an opponent. If the motion is made
prior to the close of all the evidence and is denied, the moving party
may then offer evidence without having reserved the right to do so. A
motion for judgment which is denied is not a waiver of trial by jury even
if all parties to the action have so moved.
Id. A motion for judgment at trial must be denied if there exists any evidence or
inference, taken in a light most favorable to the opponent of the motion, which supports the position that a jury could differ on the outcome of the motion. N.J. CT. R.
4:40-1 cmt.; Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399, 406, 471 A.2d 405, 409 (1984); Bell v.
Eastern Beef Co., 42 N.J. 126, 129, 199 A.2d 646, 647 (1964).
32 Landrigan, 127 N.J. at 411-12, 605 A.2d at 1083.
33 A net opinion is "an expert's bare conclusions, unsupported by factual evidence" and is, therefore, inadmissible. Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 524, 435
A.2d 1150, 1156 (1981).
34 Id. at 411-12, 605 A.2d at 1083. With regard to Dr. Sokolowski's testimony, the
trial judge explained: "Epidemiological evidence can only be used to show that a
defendant's conduct increased a plaintiffs risk of injury to some measurable extent
but it can not be used to answer the critical question did the asbestos cause Mr. Landrigan's colon cancer." Id.
On the issue of Dr. Wagoner's testimony, the trial judge stated:
Dr. Wagoner is not a medical doctor. He never prescribed a course of
treatment for cancer patients. He conducted no human research. Dr.
Wagoner teaches that if you can't find the cause of a disease by medical
observation and you can find no other cause for it, you then go to these
studies that have been conducted and pick a cause from a known risk or
an increased risk factor.
Id. at 412, 605 A.2d at 1083.
35 Id. at 411, 605 A.2d at 1083.
36 Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 243 N.J. Super. 449, 464, 579 A.2d 1268, 1275 (App.
Div. 1990), rev'd, 127 N.J. 404, 605 A.2d 1079 (1992). The appellate division elected
not to address whether the trial court had properly directed the plaintiff to try her
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Subsequently, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification
to determine whether the epidemiological evidence was properly
rejected by the lower courts.37 The court concluded that the trial
judge should have evaluated the soundness of Dr. Sokolowski's
methodology before ruling upon the value of his testimony.3,8 The
court further determined that Dr. Wagoner's causation testimony
should not have been barred simply because Wagoner was not a
medical doctor.3 9 Consequently, the supreme court reversed and
remanded the matter to the trial court, holding that the testimony
of both experts should be admitted provided that the experts had
employed a reasonable methodology.40
Case law evaluating the admissibility of scientific evidence has
sought to answer two essential questions: (1) who should assess the
claims under the strict liability theory alone. Id. at 462, 579 A.2d at 1274. The appellate division stated: "Although we agree that the trial court erred in severing plaintiff's strict liability and negligence claims for trial, our disposition of this appeal would
not be altered by the two claims having been tried together. The evidence of proximate cause would have been the same." Id.
37 Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 127 N.J. 324, 604 A.2d 599 (1990).
38 Landrigan, 127 N.J. at 420-21, 605 A.2d at 1088.
39 Id. at 422, 605 A.2d at 1088-89. The final element of the court's holding pertained to the trial court's severance of the plaintiffs strict liability and negligence
claims. Id. at 423-27, 605 A.2d at 1089-91. The court consented to review the trial
court's ruling despite the fact that no order was entered. Id. at 424, 605 A.2d at 1089.
Failure to enter an order, the court remarked, would ordinarily preclude an appeal.
Id. (citing Credit Bureau Collection Agency v. Lind, 71 N.J. Super. 326, 328-29, 177
A.2d 36, 37 (App. Div. 1961); Homeowner's Taxpayers Ass'n of S. Plainfield, Inc. v.
Borough of S. Plainfield Sewerage Auth., 60 N.J. Super. 321, 323, 158 A.2d 847, 848
(App. Div. 1960)). Since the parties agreed on the context of the trial court's ruling,
however, the justices found that the requirement of an order had been constructively
met. Id. (citing N.J. CT. R. 1:1-2; Bitting v. Willett, 47 N.J. 6, 9, 218 A.2d 859, 861
(1966)).
Justice Pollock began his analysis of this particular issue by noting that the effect
of the trial court's action was to force the plaintiff to choose one theory over the
other. Id., 605 A.2d at 1090. To assess the propriety of this ruling, the justice reviewed
the court's position on strict liability claims in asbestos cases. Id. at 425, 605 A.2d at
1090. Justice Pollock explained that the court had "limited the abolition of the stateof-the-art defense to asbestos cases." Id. at 426, 605 A.2d at 1090. A defendant's
knowledge, the court stated, is not relevant to a claim for compensatory damages
based upon a strict liability theory. Id. (citing Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 103
N.J. 643, 656, 512 A.2d 466, 473 (1986)). Justice Pollock stated that demands for
punitive damages do, however, require proof of the defendant's knowledge. Id. (citing Fischer, 103 N.J. at 656, 512 A.2d at 473).
Moreover, Justice Pollock took under advisement the defendants' concern that
jurors would be unable to separate the different levels of proof associated with the
strict liability and negligence theories. Id. at 427, 605 A.2d at 1091. The justice, however, expressed the court's confidence that careful instructions and special verdicts
would prevent jury confusion. Id. The court therefore held that on remand, the trial
court should permit the plaintiff to proceed on both claims. Id.
40 Id. at 417-18, 428, 605 A.2d at 1086, 1091.
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admissibility of expert testimony; and (2) based upon what standard should that determination be made?41 In response to the first
inquiry, courts have fashioned two antithetical approaches. 42 A liberal approach to the problem was enunciated in Ferebee v. Chevron
Chemical Co.4" In Ferebee, the family of a deceased employee of a
government agricultural research center attempted to establish a
causal connection between the decedent's affliction with pulmonary fibrosis44 and his long term occupational exposure to paraquat.45 At trial, the plaintiffs and the defendant's experts arrived
at contradictory conclusions, despite the fact that both had employed the same diagnostic methodology when formulating their
respective opinions. 46 The jury adopted the testimony of the plain41 Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4, at 1021.
42 Id. at 1022-24. One school believed that the jury should assess the reliability and
validity of expert testimony. Id. at 1022. The second school, however, felt that these
questions should be left to the court. Id. at 1024.
43 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984). See Cohen &
Mindnich, supra note 4, at 1022 (referring to the Ferebee court's liberal approach).
44 Pulmonary fibrosis is a condition characterized by "an excessive growth of fibrous connective tissue" inside the lungs. THE WORLD BOOK DIcnoNARv 791, 1686
(Clarence L. Barnhart & Robert K. Barnhart eds., 1980).
The lungs, like all other organs, are composed of a framework of supporting tissue and a vital, functioning part through which the exchanges between the blood and the air take place. The fibrous tissue is
in the framework, so that the overgrowth is at the expense of the functioning part. The fibrous tissue invades the functional tissue and re-

places it.
3 J.E. SCHMIDT, M.D., ArroRNEYs' DicTIoNARY OF MEDicINE

AND WORD FINDER

P-378

(1990).
45 Fereb, 736 F.2d at 1531-32. Paraquat is a toxic agricultural herbicide marketed
in America since 1966. Id. at 1532. Because dermal absorption of the herbicide can
cause acute injury, its sale and labelling has been federally regulated from the time
the product was first marketed in the United States. Id. Once the responsibility of the
Department of Agriculture, the Environmental Protection Agency now oversees the
packaging and distribution of paraquat. Id. Chevron is the sole distributor of paraquat in the United States. Id. The plaintiff, Richard Ferebee, was "an agricultural
worker at the Beltsville Agricultural Research Center, an installation of the United
States Department of Agriculture located in Beltsville, Maryland." Id. at 1531. Ferebee's first exposure to paraquat occurred during the outdoor growing season of
1977 and continued throughout 1978 and 1979. Id. at 1532. Ferebee sprayed the
herbicide approximately six or seven times per month with each exposure lasting approximately one to three hours. Id. As a result, the dilute chemical mixture frequently came into contact with his skin. Id.
46 Id. at 1535. At trial, the plaintiff presented the testimony of pulmonary specialist Dr. Muhammad Yusef and "Dr. Ronald G. Crystal, Chief of the Pulmonary Branch
of the Heart, Lung and Blood Institute." Id. at 1532-33. Both doctors had previously
examined, diagnosed and treated the plaintiff. Id. In addition, both doctors based
their testimony upon their own observations, medical tests performed on the plaintiff
and epidemiological studies that indicated a causal connection between dermal absorption of paraquat and the development of pulmonary fibrosis. Id. at 1533. The
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tiffs experts and held the defendant, Chevron, strictly liable because it failed
to warn of the effects of long-term exposure to
47
paraquat.
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court decision and held that in a typical battle
of the experts the jury must determine the victor.4 ' Reasoning that
judges are no more qualified to analyze the evolving sciences of
medicine and epidemiology than the lay members of a jury, the
court eschewed any duty to rule on the reliability of the experts'
opinions. 49 The D.C. Circuit's liberal reasoning has earned adherence in several jurisdictions,5" including the Third Circuit.51
plaintiff died before the case reached trial and, as a result, defendant's experts never
examined him. Id. at 1532, 1535.
47 Id. at 1532.
48 Id. at 1535 (citingJenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1962)).
On appeal, Chervron argued, inter alia, that the jury's verdict was inconsistent with the
weight of the evidence. Id. Chevron argued that paraquat is only acutely toxic, which
means that any injury caused by the herbicide will manifest itself very quickly, usually
within days or weeks, and that the injury will cease with the exposure. Id. Chevron
contended that the plaintiff's symptoms of pulmonary fibrosis did not manifest themselves until ten months after his most recent contact with paraquat and that his condition continued to progress long after his final exposure to the herbicide in 1979. Id.
Chevron maintained that there was no scientific evidence that paraquat causes any
kind of chronic injury. Id.
49 Id. at 1534. The Ferebee court declared:
Judges, both trial and appellate, have no special competence to resolve
the complex and refractory causal issues raised by the attempt to link
low-level exposure to toxic chemicals with human disease. On questions
such as these, which stand at the frontier of current medical and epidemiological inquiry, if experts are willing to testify that such a link exists,
it is for the jury to decide whether to credit such testimony.
Id. In other words, the court posited, if an expert is willing to espouse a particular
scientific theory, the jury, not the judge, is properly charged with the task of weighing
the verity and efficacy of his testimony. See id.
50 See, e.g., Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 745, cert. denied,
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Wells, et al., 479 U.S. 950 (1986) (stating that if the
trier of fact is satisfied that medical evidence establishes legal causation to a reasonable degree of certainty, it does not matter whether the scientific community requires
more research before resolving the question); Lanzilotti v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical Inc., No. 82-0183, 1986 WL 7832, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 1986) (finding that when
experts proffer opposing testimony, a jury must decide which theory is more
credible).
51 Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4, at 1023. See In reJapanese Electronic Products, 723 F.2d 238, 279 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 598 (1986) (stating that
"the suggestion that the court must, in deciding on admissibility, carefully scrutinize
the underlying assumptions, the inferences drawn, and the conclusions reached, if
followed rigorously, would result in the trial court, as distinguished from the factfinder, deciding the weight to be given to the testimony"); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co.,
596 F.2d 84, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1979) (declaring that the trial court's failure to admit
expert testimony usurped the jury's role as the fact finder).
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The second, more restrictive approach to the admission of expert testimonial evidence was adopted by the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York in In re Agent Orange
Product Liability Litigation.52 This landmark case addressed the
health problems suffered by many veterans who had been exposed
to Agent Orange, a low-level dioxin, during the Vietnam War. 53 Alleging that the plaintiffs' epidemiological evidence failed to reach
the requisite level of causation, the defendant chemical manufacturer moved for summaryjudgment. 54 In granting the motion, the
Several courts have pointed to Japanese Electronic as the prime example of the
liberal approach to admitting expert testimony. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Product
Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), afftd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d
Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Lombardi v. Dow Chemical Co., 487 U.S. 1234 (1988)
(stating that the liberal view, espoused by JapaneseElectronic, permits an expert to formulate his opinion based upon data reasonably relied upon by other members of his
field without regard to the reliability of the data itself).
52 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied
sub nom. Lombardi v. Dow Chemical Co., 487 U.S. 1234 (1988). See Cohen &
Mindnich, supra note 4, at 1024 (stating that the Eastern District of New York espoused the more restrictive view on the admissibility of evidence).
53 Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1228. Vietnam veterans and their families filed
claims against seven chemical companies, who manufactured and supplied Agent Orange to the United States government during the Vietnam War. Id. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (b) (3), the district court "certified a class action
against the defendant chemical companies." Id. at 1229. The class included members
of the American, New Zealand and Australian armed forces who, during the years
1961 to 1972, served in Vietnam and were injured as a result of exposure to Agent
Orange or certain other phenoxy herbicides in the performance of their military
duty. Id. The veterans' spouses, parents and children directly or indirectly injured as
a consequence of the exposure were also included in the class. Id. Records indicate
that approximately 600,000 service people suffered exposure to Agent Orange. Id. at
1230. The class was considerably larger, however, because it included the relatives of
the exposed veterans. Id. Two hundred eighty-one veterans opted out of the class,
filing the separate claims at issue in this action. Id. After reaching a settlement with
the members of the class, the defendants moved for summary judgment regarding the
separately filed claims. Id.
54 Id. To establish causation, the plaintiffs relied upon epidemiological studies and
the general affidavits of various doctors, two of which were accompanied by affidavits
of the plaintiffs. Id. at 1231-39. The court held that the testimony of the two doctors
was inadmissible because the doctors had relied upon the affidavits and checklists
prepared by the veterans to formulate their opinions. Id. at 1246. The court explained that the affidavits and checklists were not admissible under Federal Rule of
Evidence 703 because experts would not reasonably rely upon them. Id. The court
further stated that it "takes judicial notice-based on hundreds of trials-that no reputable physician relies on hearsay checklists by litigants to reach a conclusion with
respect to the cause of their afflictions." Id. (citations omitted).
For other cases addressing the issue of summary judgment and court control in
toxic tort litigation where epidemiological evidence is relied upon, see Fontenot v.
Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1195-97 (5th Cir. 1986) (granting a motion for summary
judgment where the plaintiff failed to produce evidence that progesterone, manufactured by the defendant, caused birth defects); Marder v. G.D. Searle & Co., 630
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court held that in situations where proof of causation rests almost
entirely upon expert opinion, a stricter standard ought to be applied. 5 5 This strict standard, the court explained, requires the trial
judge to carefully scrutinize the sources of proffered evidence
before presentation to the jury.5 6 Given the specialized nature of
that toxic tort
evidence in toxic tort litigation, the court suggested
57
cases should always employ this stricter standard.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, has rejected the
strict standard and has inclined toward the liberal approach.5 8 In
Bowen v. Bowen,59 a divorce action, the supreme court faced the
difficult task of placing a value on a minority stock interest in a
close corporation.6' The Bowen court approved the admission of
F.Supp. 1087, 1095 (D. Md. 1986), affd without opinion sub nom. Wheelahan v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 814 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that epidemiological and nonepidemiological evidence did not establish causation in a case involving an intrauterine device); Richardson by Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 799,
799-800 (D.D.C. 1986), aftd, 857 F.2d 823, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
218 (1989) (granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict in a case alleging birth
defects caused by Bendectin).
55 Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1244.
56 Id. The court opined that a trial judge should at least confirm that the expert
founded "his or her opinion on sufficient factual data, [did] not rely on hearsay
deemed unreliable by other experts in the field, and assert[ed] conclusions with sufficient certainty to be useful given applicable burdens of proof." Id.
57 Id. at 1260. The court explained that "(It]he uncertainty of the evidence in such
cases, dependent as it is upon speculative scientific hypotheses and epidemiological
studies, creates a special need for robust screening of experts and gatekeeping under
Rules 403 and 703 by the court." Id.
The approach espoused by the Agent Orange court has considerable support in
other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Head v. Lithonia Corp., 881 F.2d 941, 944 (10th Cir.
1989) (stating that the trial court ought to conduct a preliminary examination of
expert opinion testimony to discover whether the opinion and its factual foundations
are reliable); Richardson, 649 F. Supp. at 829 (declaring that a court should, as a matter of law, determine whether an expert's testimony is sufficiently grounded in fact);
Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987) (explaining that a
trial judge is entitled to inquire as to the reliability and factual basis of an expert's
opinion); Lynch v. Merrell-National Lab., 646 F. Supp. 856, 864 (D. Mass. 1986), af'd,
830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that courts must question whether comparable
experts in the witness's field would rely on the same data and whether that reliance is
reasonable); Marder,630 F. Supp. at 1089 (citations omitted) (observing that the purpose of the trial court's inquiry is to make certain that an expert's testimony is not
without factual support).
58 Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4, at 1023.
59 96 NJ. 36, 473 A.2d 73 (1984).
60 Id. at 40, 473 A.2d at 75. The parties in Bowen married in 1955 and were the
parents of four children. Id. Early in the marriage, Mrs. Bowen worked to help finance her husband's engineering education. Id. Mr. Bowen left his employment at
Union Carbide in 1971 to accept a position at a small manufacturing firm. Id. Two
years later, Mr. Bowen formed the Polycel Corporation with two other employees of
the manufacturing firm. Id. At the time of the divorce, Mr. Bowen was a twenty-two
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an accountant's testimony even though the witness could offer no
proof that his conclusion was based upon generally accepted accounting principles. 6 ' The court held that the unreliability of the
testimony pertains only to weight and credibility, not admissibility. 62 According to the Bowen ruling, the judge must decide the
admissibility of the testimony, and the jury must determine the
proper weight to which the testimony is entitled.6" Therefore, the
question of unreliability is properly left to the jury.4
Six years later, the NewJersey Supreme Court cited the Bowen
decision with approval in Ryan v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc.6 5 In Ryan,
the court reiterated its position that the jury, not the judge, should
decide how much weight to accord the testimony of a given expercent shareholder in Polycel. Id. The lower court ordered that all marital property
be divided equally between Mr. and Mrs. Bowen based on the length of the marriage.
Id. In so doing, the trial court arrived at what it considered to be "an entirely new and
more practical scheme of distribution." Id. (citing the unreported trial court decision). The trial court ordered that the husband retain legal title to all the stock while
awarding the wife an equitable title to one-half of the stock. Id. at 40-41, 473 A.2d at
75. The appellate division affirmed. Id. at 41, 473 A.2d at 75. The supreme court,
however, reversed and remanded, directing the trial court to arrive at a value for the
stock. Id. at 53, 473 A.2d at 82.
61 Id. at 49, 53, 473 A.2d at 80, 82.
62 Id. at 49, 473 A.2d at 80.
63 Ryan v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 121 NJ. 276, 284, 579 A.2d 1241, 1245 (1990).
Because the Bowen court's analysis of evidentiary standards was not the primary focus
of the opinion, its significance as evidentiary precedent was negligible until its treatment in Ryan. See id. The Ryan ruling gave the impression that the Bowen court engaged in a lengthy explanation of New Jersey's position on the admission of expert
testimony. See id. In actuality, the Ryan court seized upon a single sentence in the very
last paragraph of the Bowen opinion and formulated a doctrine by implication. Id.
(citing Bowen, 96 N.J. at 53, 473 A.2d at 82) ("[O]pinions of value not based upon
evidence in the record or of proven acceptance in the field should be given little
weight.")). See Brian Simon, The Basis of Expert Testimony: Ryan v. KDI Sylvan Pools Lets
the Experts Have Their Way, 43 RUrGERS L. REv. 1235, 1242 n.54 (1991) (suggesting that
the Ryan court embraced the wrong statement of the Bowen holding).
64 Ryan, 121 N.J. at 284, 579 A.2d at 1245.
65 Id. In Ryan, the plaintiff was injured after diving into a residential swimming
pool. Id. at 279, 579 A.2d at 1242. Plaintiff brought suit against the pool manufacturer alleging defective design and failure to provide adequate warning. Id. at 278,
579 A.2d at 1242. At trial, the defendant presented the testimony of Joseph
Schmerler, an expert on the standards of the swimming pool industry. Id. at 281, 579
A.2d at 1243. The witness testified that the defendant had constructed the pool according to industry standards and that no posted warnings were needed at residential
pools. Id. The trial court refused to admit Schmerler's testimony because the judge
could not identify its factual foundation and, therefore, could not assess the reasonableness of the expert's reliance. Id. at 282, 579 A.2d at 1244. Subsequently, the appellate division affirmed, and the supreme court reversed and remanded. Id. at 283, 289,
579 A.2d at 1244, 1248. See generally Simon, supra note 63 (discussing Ryan's place in
New Jersey's evidentiary scheme).
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pert.66 The Ryan holding also placed limitations upon the trial
judge's role in determining admissibility. 67 Specifically, the court
stated that the relevant judicial inquiry should be confined to
whether other experts in the witness's field would rely upon the
same facts in drawing their conclusions. 68 If such reliance is identified, the court continued, a presumption of reasonableness arises
and the testimony may be presented to the jury.6 9 The Ryan court
posited that an automatic presumption of reliability, without some
measure of judicial inquiry, would run counter to Federal Rule of
Evidence 70370 and its counterpart, New Jersey Rule of Evidence
56(2) .71 According to the Ryan holding, judges have the duty to
Ryan, 121 N.J. at 284, 579 A.2d at 1245.
Id. at 289, 579 A.2d at 1247-48.
Id., 579 A.2d at 1248. The court may consider only whether other experts rely
on the data. Id. The judge cannot substitute his judgment on the reasonableness of
that reliance. Id.
69 Id., 579 A.2d at 1247.
70 Federal Rule of Evidence 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the
expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
FED. R. Evm. 703.
71 Ryan, 121 N.J. at 288, 579 A.2d at 1247 (citation omitted). At the time Landrigan was decided, New Jersey Rule of Evidence 56(2) provided:
A witness qualified pursuant to Rule 19 as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training or education may testify in the form of opinion or
otherwise as to matters requiring scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge if such testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. The facts or data in the
particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may
be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need
not be admissible in evidence.
NJ. Evid. R 56(2).
Rule 56(2) has been replaced by NewJersey Rules of Evidence 702 and 703. See
COMMrIrEE REPORT, supra note 24, at 29. Rule 702 states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
N.J.R.E. 702. Rule 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the
expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
N.J.R.E. 703.
66
67
68
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determine whether an expert's reliance on data is reasonable. 2
Thus, the Ryan court's formulation represents a compromise by
limiting trial judges to a minimal level of review while still maintaining a measure of judicial scrutiny.
The second major question plaguing courts with regard to
toxic tort litigation is the standard used to determine the admissibility of an expert's testimony. 74 The best known theory of admissibility dates back nearly seventy years to the "general acceptance"
standard articulated in Fye v. United States.75 In Frye, the seminal
case on the admission of expert testimony,76 the court considered
the admissibility of a systolic blood pressure deception test, which
in 1923 represented a relatively new scientific method. 7 7 Recogniz72 Ryan, 121 N.J. at 289, 579 A.2d at 1247. One commentator proposed that the
Ryan holding "creates a risk that untrustworthy testimony will get to the jury." Simon,
supra note 63, at 1253.
73 Ryan, 121 N.J. at 289, 579 A.2d at 1247-48. The Ryan court held:
We interpret Evidence Rule 56(2) to require that a court make inquiry
into and a finding on whether experts in the given field rely on certain
information. If such reliance be found, then it is presumed to be reasonable. That interpretation of the Rule strikes a fair balance between
the intent of the amended language and the "spirit" of the prior Rule,
which has been interpreted to require the court to make a determination on the reliability of the testimony. The amendment was made explicitly to expand the data on which an expert can rely in forming an
opinion. The focus should be on what the experts in fact rely on, not
on whether the court thinks they should so rely. Requiring the trial
court to make a finding on whether experts in the field actually rely on
certain information satisfies the intent of the new language. Allowing
the court to overrule that presumption of reliability will result in the
exclusion of evidence only under unusual or extreme circumstances,
thus satisfying the "spirit" of the former Rule.
Id.
74 See Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4, at 1025-34.
75 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4, at 1027. For a
more comprehensive treatment of the Frye holding, see Melissa M. Home, Note, Novel
Scientific Evidence: Does Frye Require That General Acceptance Within the Scientific Community be Establishedby DisinterestedScientists?, 65 U. DET. L. Rxv. 147 (1987); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientifc Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century
Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980); Andre A. Moenssens, Admissibility Of Scientific
Evidence-An Alternative To The Frye Rule, 25 WM. & MARY L. RExv. 545 (1983-84).
76 See State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508, 517, 443 A.2d 1020, 1024 (1982); Cohen &
Mindnich, supra note 4, at 1027. It is a piece of judicial irony that this landmark
opinion, which forms the foundation of American evidentiary law and has been the
subject of considerable legal commentary, is only two pages long and cites no case law
in support of its conclusion. See Frye, 293 F. at 101314.
77 Id. at 1013. In Frye, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder. Id.
At trial, his attorney sought to introduce into evidence the results of a systolic blood
pressure deception test. Id. The theory behind the test, which is a forerunner of the
polygraph test, is that "truth is spontaneous, and comes without conscious effort,
while the utterance of a falsehood requires a conscious effort, which is reflected in the
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ing that judges are often ill-equipped to assess the reliability of expert testimony, the Fye test requires an expert to rest his
conclusions upon principles which have achieved general acceptance within the scientific community.7 8 Once the proponent of
the testimony has met the burden of proving that the evidence has
attained general acceptance, the judicial inquiry ends and the testimony may be entered on the record.7 9
Although the Frye holding remained a legal fixture in many
jurisdictions,8" several courts, including the United States Supreme
Court, have recently rejected the general acceptance standard primarily because of the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 8 ' While the Federal Rules of Evidence do not adopt a
blood pressure." Id. at 1014. The trial court, in accordance with the government's
objections, would not allow testimony from the scientist who conducted the defendant's test. Id. The court also refused to have the test performed in the courtroom
before the jury. Id. In upholding the decision of the lower court, the D.C. Circuit
held that the systolic blood pressure test had "not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify
the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development,
and experiments thus far made." Id.
78 Id. Specifically, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere
in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery,
the thingfrom which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particularfield in which it belongs.
Id. (emphasis added). If the basis of the testimony has not reached this level of development, the Frye court explained, the trial judge may not admit it into evidence. Id.
79 See id.

80 See EdwardJ. Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Juy: Who Should Decide Questions Of Preliminary Facts Conditioning The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv.
577, 577 (1984) (stating that approximately forty-five jurisdictions had adopted the
Frye general acceptance standard by the late 70's). See infra note 159 (discussing the
United States Supreme Court's rejection of Frye in the case Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals).
81 Imwinkelried, supra note 80, at 578 (stating that, as of 1984, fifteen states and
two federal circuits had rejected the Frye rule). See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583
F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978) (positing that judicial inquiry into the admissibility of
scientific evidence must evidence conventional considerations, such as reliability,
probativeness, and materiality against the likelihood of prejudice or confusion of the
jury); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019
(1975) (suggesting that relevant scientific evidence which is not prejudicial should be
admitted and that its credibility is an issue for cross-examination); United States v.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985) (rejecting the general acceptance standard and articulating a more flexible three-step analysis that involves assessing the
reliability of testimony, the scientific technique, balancing the helpfulness of evidence
with any confusion the technique might cause the jury and determining the relevancy
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specific theory of admissibility, Federal Rule of Evidence 70282
seems to run contrary to the rigid general acceptance standard. 83
Particularly, Rule 702 calls for the admission of expert testimony
whenever it would be helpful to the trier of fact.8 4 Recentjurisprudence has begun to recognize that evidence which fails to meet the
standard of general acceptance may nevertheless assist a jury in
making its final determination.8 5 Consequently, several courts have
enunciated their own method of assessing the reliability of opinion
testimony.8 6
Whereas Rule 702 governs the admission of expert testimony
in the federal courts, Rule of Evidence 56(2) governs the admission of expert testimony in the New Jersey court system.8 7 The
original text of Rule 56(2) stood for the proposition that expert
of the evidence to the issue at bar). See infra note 159 (discussing the United States
Supreme Court's rejection of Frye in the case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals).
One commentator noted that numerous ambiguities exist as to the appropriate
application of the general acceptance standard. Giannelli, supra note 75, at 1208.
Giannelli listed the following unanswered questions: who must accept the procedure,
what must be accepted, and by what method. Id. As a result, Giannelli stated, courts
have found it necessary to establish the parameters of the general acceptance standard more narrowly than the Frye court. Id.
82 Specifically, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. Evm. 702.
83 See Cohen & Mindnich, supranote 4, at 1028. See infra note 159 (discussing the
United States Supreme Court's rejection of Frye in the case Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals).
84 FED. R. EVID. 702. See supra note 82 (providing the text of Rule 702).
85 See Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4, at 1028-30 (citing Downing, 753 F.2d 1224
(3d Cir. 1975)). See infra note 159 (discussing the United States Supreme Court's
rejection of Frye in the case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals).
86 Id. at 1028. See supra note 81 (discussing the methods of assessing reliability
utilized by other courts) and infra note 159 (discussing the United States Supreme
Court's rejection of Frye in the case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals).
87 NJ. Evid. R. 56(2). See supra note 71 (providing the text of Rule 56(2) and its
newly enacted counterparts, Rules 702 and 703). The initial version of the rule was
adopted in 1967. NJ. Evid. R. 56(2) (1967). The initiative to codify the New Jersey
Rules of Evidence began in 1955 with the report of theJacobs Committee. RicHARDJ.
BrumNo, NEwJERmEY RuLm OF EvIDENCE, preface by the Commission (Gann 1992 ed.).
The effort continued in 1956 under the aegis of the Bigelow Commission. Id. The
Evidence Act of 1960 adopted Rule 1(1) through 1(13), Rule 2 and Rules 23 through
40. Id. The Act also established a system for the adoption of future rules. Id. This
mechanism allowed the supreme court to propose rules to the Legislature. Id. Rule
56(2) was among the final set of rules proposed by the court in 1964 and adopted by
the Legislature in 1967. Id. The original version of the rule stated:
If the witness is testifying as an expert, testimony of the witness in the
form of opinions or inferences is limited to such opinions as the judge
finds are (a) based primarily on facts, data or other expert opinion es-
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testimony, and the scientific principles which support it, must be
reasonably reliable.88 Although the reasonable reliability standard
did not appear in the plain language of the rule, its presence was
implied in section (b) .89 Specifically, testimony cannot be within
an expert's special knowledge or skill if the field from which the
expert derives such knowledge and skill has not been deemed reliable by the courts.'
This requirement of reasonable reliability, long a part of New
Jersey's common law of evidence, predated New Jersey's adoption
of Rule 56(2).2 Indeed, the NewJersey courts defined reasonable
reliability according to the general acceptance doctrine enunciated
in Fye.92 In the 1967 State v. Hurd decision,9" however, the New
tablished by evidence at the trial and (b) within the scope of the special
knowledge, skill, experience or training possessed by the witness.
N.J. Evid. R. 56(2) (1967).
88 Simon, supra note 63, at 1240. For cases delineating New Jersey's viewpoint on
reasonable reliability, see State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 209, 478 A.2d 364, 379-80 (1984);
Bowen v. Bowen, 96 N.J. 36, 49, 473 A.2d 73, 79-80 (1984); State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J.
508, 519-20, 443 A.2d 1020, 1025-26 (1982); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 536, 432 A.2d
86, 91 (1981); State v. Carey, 49 N.J. 343, 352, 230 A.2d 384, 389 (1967).
89 Cavallo, 88 N.J. at 516, 443 A.2d at 1024. See supra note 87 for the text of the
original rule.
90 Cavallo, 88 N.J. at 517 n.2, 443 A.2d at 1024 n.2.
91 Id.
92 Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4, at 1031. In State v. Kelly, the New Jersey
Supreme Court explained:
To meet the requirement that the expert's testimony be sufficiently reliable, defense counsel must show that the testimony satisfies NewJersey's
standard of acceptability for scientific evidence. The technique or
mode of analysis used by the expert must have a sufficient scientific basis to produce uniform and reasonably reliable results so as to contribute materially to the ascertainment of the truth.
Kelly, 97 N.J. at 209-10, 478 A.2d at 380 (citations omitted).
93 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981). Paul Hurd was accused of attempting to murder his former wife, Jane Sell. Id. at 530, 432 A.2d at 89. Hurd and Sell had had a
particularly contentious relationship since their divorce in 1971, disagreeing over the
disposition ofjointly held property and visitation rights. Id. The most recent altercation took place by telephone between Hurd and David Sell, second husband ofJane,
on the night of the assault. Id. Later in the evening, David Sell, who had been sleeping in the living room, was awakened by the sound of his wife's screams. Id. Rushing
to the bedroom, David Sell met his wife, who claimed to have been stabbed by an
unidentified attacker who had entered through the bedroom window. Id. After the
attack, Mrs. Sell was unable to identify her assailant but referred the police to her exhusband. Id. From that time on, the police investigation focused on Hurd and David
Sell as the two primary suspects. Id. Because of Mrs. Sell's continuing inability to
recall her attacker, the prosecutor's office recommended that she consult a psychiatrist in order to refresh her recollection through hypnosis. Id. While in a trance, Mrs.
Sell identified Hurd as her assailant. Id. at 531, 432 A.2d at 89. Although she had
expressed some initial mistrust of her identification, she nonetheless signed a statement, at the urging of the police department, which labelled Hurd as her attacker.
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Jersey Supreme Court articulated a slightly reformulated standard.9 4 The Hurd court held that hypnotically refreshed testimony
is not admissible absent specified procedures to ensure its reliability.9" Adding to the Frye test, the court proclaimed that expert testimony could be admitted only if it had sufficient factual basis to
produce reasonably reliable, homogenous results that would materially contribute to the ascertainment of the truth.9 6 With this
modification, the court demonstrated a belief that reasonable reliability is a case-specific determination.9 7
The Hurd test incorporated into the general acceptance standard an interest in protecting litigants from unreliable testimony
that unfairly prejudices their cases. 98 Moreover, the additional reId. at 531-32, 432 A.2d at 89. Based upon that statement, Hurd was arrested and
indicted. Id. at 532, 432 A.2d at 89. After a lengthy hearing, the trial court refused to
admit Mrs. Sell's identification of Hurd, not because it found hypnotically refreshed
testimony to be per se inadmissible but because the State could not prove that it had
complied with enumerated procedural safeguards. Id. at 532-33, 432 A.2d at 89-90.
The appellate division denied the State's motion for leave to appeal the decision of
the trial court. Id. at 533, 432 A.2d at 90. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed
the appellate division's denial of the motion for leave to appeal. Id. at 533-34, 432
A.2d at 90.
94 Id. at 536, 432 A.2d at 91. The Hurd court stated that this standard had previously been restricted to physical test results. Id. (citations omitted). In this case, the
court believed "that the policy reasons embodied in the general acceptance standard
are germane to hypnotically refreshed testimony as well." Id.
95 Id. at 536-37, 432 A.2d at 91-92.
96 Id. at 536, 432 A.2d at 91 (quoting State v. Cary, 49 NJ. 343, 352, 230 A.2d 384,
389 (1967)). See also State v. Cavallo, 88 NJ. 508, 520-21, 443 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1982)
(stating that the Hurd holding is an addendum to the Fye test).
97 Id. at 520, 443 A.2d at 1026. The Cavallo court stated "[e]xpert evidence that
poses too great a danger of prejudice in some situations, and for some purposes, may
be admissible in other circumstances where it will be more helpful and less prejudicial." Id.
98 See id. When expert testimony is more likely to confuse than assist the trier of
fact, however, a trial judge is entitled to deny admission of the testimony. N.J. Evid. R.
4. At the time Landriganwas decided, New Jersey Rule of Evidence 4 provided:
The judge may in his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission
will either (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantialdanger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleadingthe
jury.
Id. (emphasis added).
Rule 4 has been replaced by New Jersey Rule of Evidence 403, which provides:
Except as otherwise provided by these rules or other law, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the risk of (a) undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading
the jury or (b) undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
N.J.R.E. 403. See also Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 283, 445 A.2d 1141,
1147 (1982) (stating that expert testimony is necessary where "the matter to be dealt
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quirement that expert evidence assist the trier of fact signalled the
beginning of NewJersey's rejection of the general acceptance standard and sparked the attendant realization that evidence which
fails to meet the general acceptance requirement may nonetheless
help to inform a jury's decision.99
The Hurd formulation foreshadowed the amended version of
New Jersey Rule of Evidence 56(2), which took effect on July 1,
1982.100 The language, borrowed from Federal Rule of Evidence
702,101 gave effect to the Hurd ruling by incorporating the requirement that expert testimony assist the trier of fact."0 2 The amended
rule further liberalized the standard for the admission of expert
testimony by approving its admissibility based upon facts not adduced at trial.1 "' Moreover, under the new rule, the facts upon
which testimony is based need not even be admissible.'
After the amendment of Rule 56(2), the NewJersey Supreme
Court decided the landmark case, State v. Kelly.' °5 In Kelly, the
with is so esoteric that jurors of common judgment and experience cannot form a
valid judgment as to whether the conduct of the party was reasonable") (citations
omitted). The primary purpose of expert testimony has always been to help jurors
understand and decide complex issues. Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4, at 1011-12.
99 See infra notes 107-126 and accompanying text (discussing New Jersey's gradual
rejection of the general acceptance standard).
100 N.J. Evid. R. 56(2) (requiring expert testimony to assist the trier of fact). For
the text of former NewJersey Rule of Evidence 56(2), see supra note 71.
101 FED. R. EVID. 702. The language of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is essentially
identical to that of New Jersey Evidence Rule 56(2). Compare FED. R. EvD. 702 with
N.J. Evid. R. 56(2). For the provisions of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, see supra note
82.
102 N.J. Evid. R. 56(2). The motive behind the change was to "'allow more latitude
in the admission of expert opinion testimony' without being inconsistent with the
'spirit' of the old rule." N.J. Evid. R. 56(2) cmt. 7 (citing Ryan v. KDI Sylvan Pools,
Inc., 121 N.J. 276, 284, 579 A.2d 1241, 1245 (1990); Rubanik v. Witco Chemical Corp.,
242 N.J. Super. 36, 50, 576 A.2d 4, 11 (1990)).
103 N.J. Evid. R. 56(2). In this regard the amended rule marks a change from the
original version passed in 1967. See supra note 87 (setting forth the text of the original
rule). The plain language of section (a) of the old rule explicitly stated that opinion
testimony must rest on factual evidence already entered on the record. N.J. Evid. R.
56(2). Some courts were rather lenient in their enforcement of this provision. Simon, supra note 63, at 1239-40. Despite the flexible approach employed by some, all
courts obeyed a minimum admissibility standard. Id. at 1240. According to this standard, no expert could present to a jury a conclusion which completely lacked factual
foundation. Id. Such a conclusion is a net opinion. Id. See supra note 33 (discussing
the net opinion rule).
104 N.J. Evid. RL 56(2).
105 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984). The NewJersey Supreme Court's opinion in
Kelly has been recognized as a landmark decision throughout the country. Lawrence
S. Lustberg &John V. Jacobi, The Battered Woman As ReasonablePerson:A Critique Of The
Appellate Division Decision In State v. McClain, 22 SETON HALL L. REv. 365, 369 n.23
(1992) (citing State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 973-74 (Ohio 1990) (citing Kelly to sup-
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court assessed whether testimony on battered woman's syndrome
met the standard for the admission of scientific evidence imposed
by Rule 56(2).1o6 The defendant in Kelly, a wife accused of murdering her husband, claimed that she had acted in self-defense.10 7 Defense counsel attempted to support this claim with evidence on
battered woman's syndrome, a relatively novel scientific theory. 0 8
Ultimately, the supreme court reversed and remanded the case for
a new trial because the trial court failed to admit testimony on battered woman's syndrome." °
The Kelly court commenced its analysis by outlining the three
basic requirements of Rule 56(2).110 First, the court articulated,
testimony must pertain to a topic that is beyond the understanding
port the proposition that battered woman's syndrome is not within ajuror's common
knowledge and, therefore, requires expert testimony); State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d
793, 798 n.2 (Minn. 1989) (citing Kelly as one of the many cases holding that testimony on battered woman's syndrome is admissible); People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr.
167, 180 n.5 (Cal. CL App. 1989) (citing Kelly to support the admission of expert
testimony on battered woman's syndrome); State v. Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586, 591
(N.C. CL App. 1988) (citing Kelly in support of the proposition that battered women
are frequently so immobilized by fear of their abusive spouse that they cannot act in
their own defense); Commonwealth v. McNeely, 534 A.2d 778, 780 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987) (noting that Kelly held expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome to be
admissible evidence of self-defense); State v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563, 567 (Kan. 1986)
(noting the Kelly court's belief that testimony on battered woman's syndrome is beyond the comprehension of the average juror); State v. Hill, 339 S.E.2d 121, 122 (S.C.
1986) (adopting Kelly's definition of battered woman's syndrome); People v. Torres,
488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 360 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1985) (listing Kelly among the cases favoring the
admissibility of expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome); State v. Moore, 695
P.2d 985, 989-90 (Or. CL App. 1985) (Newman, J., concurring) (extensively quoting
the Kelly discussion on the characteristics of battered woman's syndrome).
106 Kelly, 97 N.J. at 187, 208, 478 A.2d at 368, 379.
107 Id. at 187-88, 478 A.2d at 368. The "defendant, Gladys Kelly, stabbed her husband, Ernest, with a pair of scissors." Id. at 187, 478 A.2d 368. Ernest died as a result
of the injuries he sustained. Id. At trial, the defense claimed that Gladys had acted in
self-defense. Id. at 188, 478 A.2d at 368. Apparently, over the course of their seven
year marriage, Ernest had repeatedly beat Gladys. Id. at 187-88, 478 A.2d at 368. The
defendant contended that Ernest had assaulted her on the afternoon of the stabbing.
Id. Gladys stated that she feared that if she did not defend herself, her husband
would kill her. Id.
108 Id. To establish the appropriate mens rea for the self-defense claim, the defense
presented the testimony of Dr. Lois Veronen-an expert on battered woman's syndrome. Id. See Lustberg &Jacobi, supra note 105 (criticizing the McClain court's interpretation of Kelly).
109 Kelly, 97 N.J. at 212-14, 478 A.2d at 381-82. The Kelly court felt that the defendant's witness qualified as an expert on battered woman's syndrome. Id. at 212, 478
A.2d at 381. The court also believed that the theories upon which the testimony was
based had achieved sufficient reliability in the scientific community. Id. Because the
trial court never addressed the issue of reliability, finding instead that the witness was
not qualified, the court remanded for a new trial. Id.
110 Id. at 208, 478 A.2d at 379.
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of the average juror."'* The second requirement, the court declared, is that the proffered testimony must be reliable and from a
sufficiently developed scientific area.112 Finally, the court explained, the witness must be qualified to offer such testimony.113
Battered woman's syndrome, the court proposed, met all three of
these requirements.' 14 Although the Kelly court made no express
attempt to overturn the general acceptance standard, the court's
willingness to admit a relatively new scientific theory established a
115
movement toward liberalization of the admissibility standard.
The NewJersey Supreme Court made its greatest stride toward
liberalizing the standard for admission of new scientific theories in
Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp. 1 6 The Rubanick court considered
whether a biochemist was qualified to testify that PCB1 7 exposure
could cause colon cancer.11 The biochemist's status as a "nonphysician," the court ruled, did not preclude him from testifying as to
the cause of the plaintiffs cancer." 9 More significantly, however,
the Rubanick court asserted that general acceptance was not the
111 Id.

Id. Specifically, the court explained:
In effect, this Rule imposes three basic requirements for the admission
of expert testimony: (1) the intended testimony must concern a subject
matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the field testified
to must be at a state of the art such that an expert's testimony could be
sufficiently reliable; and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to
offer the intended testimony.
Id. (citations omitted).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 210-12, 478 A.2d at 380-81. In particular, the court stated that the "subject
is beyond the ken of the average juror and thus is suitable for explanation through
expert testimony." Id. at 209 n.15, 478 A.2d at 379 n.15 (citing Ibn-Tamas v. United
States, 407 A.2d 626, 635 (D.C. 1979); Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 806, reh'
denied, 415 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683
(Ga. 1981); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981)). The court, however, remanded the matter to the trial court in order to give the State an opportunity to cross
examine the witness and challenge the finding that battered woman's syndrome represents a reasonably reliable scientific theory. Id. at 212-13, 478 A.2d at 381.
115 Id. at 212, 478 A-2d at 380-81. See Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Co., 125 N.J. 421,
447, 593 A.2d 733, 747 (1991).
116 125 N.J. 421, 593 A.2d 733 (1991).
117 PCB, an acronym for polychlorinated biphenyl, is "any one of a group of poisonous chemicals used in industry as electrical insulators and in plastics manufacture,
found in wildlife at levels approaching the concentration of DDT and similar insecticides." THE WoRLw BOOK DICTIONARY 1615 (Clarence L. Barnhart & Robert K. Barnhart eds., 1980).
118 Rubanich, 125 N.J. at 424, 593 A.2d at 734.
119 Id. at 452, 593 A.2d at 749. The court did not suggest that non-physicians
should automatically qualify as expert witnesses. Id. at 453, 593 A.2d at 750. The court
posited, however, that courts should scrutinize an expert's reliability and credibility
and direct the factfinder accordingly. Id.
112
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only measure of reliability. 120 In evaluating the admissibility of scientific testimony, the court noted, the trial judge should examine
the soundness of the expert's methodology but not the soundness
of his ultimate conclusion. 12 ' The court, adhering to the Ryan
holding, stated that it is irrelevant whether the trial judge believes
that reliance on the underlying data is reasonable. 22 Rather, the
court articulated, the trial court need consider only whether comparable experts would arrive at the same conclusion. 23
In arriving at this decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court recalled its ruling in Kelly. 124 According to the Rubanick court, the
holding in Kelly represented a previous willingness to recognize a
relatively new and undeveloped scientific theory, i.e., battered woman's syndrome. 25 The Rubanick court acknowledged that the
abandonment of the general acceptance standard was a bold departure.126 The Rubanick majority concluded that sound reasons
existed for utilizing a broadened standard to determine the admissibility and reliability of1scientific
hypotheses which establish causa27
cases.
tort
toxic
in
tion
Against this backdrop of judicial precedent, the Landrigan
court assessed the reliability of utilizing epidemiological evidence
to establish a causal connection between asbestos exposure and colon cancer. 128 The Landrigan court focused on two issues: (1)
120 Id. at 449, 593 A.2d at 747-48. Additionally, the court held that the proponent
of a toxic tort claim can rely on a theory of causation that has not achieved general
acceptance in the scientific community, provided that the theory rests upon "a sound,
adequately-founded scientific methodology involving data and information of the
type reasonably relied on by experts in the scientific field." Id.
121 Id. at 449-50, 593 A.2d at 748.
122 Id. at 452, 593 A.2d at 749 (citing Ryan v. KDI Sylvan Pools Inc., 121 N.J. 276,
289, 579 A.2d 1241, 1247 (1990)). For a detailed analysis of the Ryan court's reasoning, see supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
123 Rubanik, 125 N.J. at 452, 593 A.2d at 749 (citing Ryan, 121 N.J. at 289, 579 A.2d
at 1247).
124 Id. at 447, 593 A.2d at 747 (citing State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364
(1984)). See supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text (discussing the seminal Kelly
decision).
125 Rubanik, 125 N.J. at 447, 593 A.2d at 747 (citing Kelly, 97 N.J. at 190-214, 478
A.2d at 369-82).
126 Id. at 433, 593 A.2d at 739.
127 Id. at 454, 593 A.2d at 750.
128 Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 127 NJ. 404, 413-23, 605 A.2d 1079, 1083-89
(1992). Prior to the supreme court's ruling in Landrigan, the most comprehensive
analysis of epidemiological evidence by any NewJersey court appeared in Landriganv.
Celotex Corp. and Grassis v. Johns-Manville Corp. See Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 243
N.J. Super. 449, 579 A.2d 1268 (App. Div. 1990); Grassis v. Johns-Manville Corp., 248
N.J. Super. 446, 591 A.2d 671 (App. Div. 1991). In Grassis, the plaintiff sued his employer claiming that on the job exposure to asbestos dust caused him to develop co-
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whether Dr. Sokolowski's testimony was reliable; and (2) whether
Dr. Wagoner, a non-physician, was qualified to testify as to the
proximate cause of the decedent's illness. 12 9 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Pollock began the analysis by reiterating the
three-part interpretation of Rule 56(2) set forth in Kelly.13 0 The
justice noted that the court's inquiry would concentrate on the last
two elements of this rule, which address the 3reliability of expert
testimony and the qualifications of witnesses.1 1
Justice Pollock explained that the NewJersey Supreme Court's
holding in Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp. provided a proper
framework within which Landrigan could be decided."3 2 The jusIon cancer. Grassis, 248 N.J. Super. at 449, 591 A.2d at 672-73. To support this claim,
the plaintiff presented Dr. Susan Daum as an expert witness. Id. at 450, 591 A.2d at
673. The Grassis court set out to determine under what conditions a physician could
utilize epidemiological evidence to establish a causal connection between a disease
and the environmental factor suspected of causing it. Id. at 451, 591 A.2d at 674. The
court distinguished Grassisfrom other cases addressing the admissibility of epidemiological evidence on the ground that the expert in Grassiswas a medical doctor, as well
as an epidemiologist. Id. As a result, the court explained, the expert had analyzed
epidemiological studies in conjunction with personal medical observations about the
cause of the plaintiffs colon cancer. Id. Holding that the doctor's testimony as to
causation was improperly excluded, the appellate division declared that an epidemiologist cannot testify that asbestos, more likely than not, caused a given individual's
colon cancer. Id. at 454, 456, 591 A.2d at 675, 676 (citing Landrigan, 243 N.J. Super.
at 462, 579 A.2d at 1274). The court ruled that only a physician or other professional
who has actually examined a particular plaintiff can testify as to the cause of the plaintiff's disease. Id. at 454, 591 A.2d at 675. Because the doctor in Grassis did not base
her opinion solely upon epidemiological studies, the court found that her conclusions were not inadmissible as net opinions. Id. at 456, 591 A.2d at 676. The appellate division in Grassis and the supreme court in Landrigan,however, agreed that a
risk factor of 2.0 is not a prerequisite to an expert relying upon a particular study to
demonstrate causation. Compare Grassis, 248 N.J. Super. at 455-56, 591 A.2d at 676
with Landrigan, 127 N.J. at 419, 605 A.2d at 1087.
129 Landrigan, 127 N.J. at 412, 605 A.2d at 1083. Justice Pollock explained:
Epidemiology, then, relates to two aspects of plaintiff's proof. For the
physician, Dr. Sokolowski, epidemiological studies provided some of the
facts on which he relied to conclude that asbestos exposure had caused
decedent's colon cancer. Concerning Dr. Wagoner, the epidemiologist,
the main issue was whether he was qualified as a non-physician to
render an opinion that the exposure had been the cause of decedent's
cancer.
Id.
130 Id. at 413, 605 A.2d at 1084. For a complete discussion of the Ke/!y standard, see
supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
'3' Id. at 413, 605 A.2d at 1084.
132 Id. at 413-14, 605 A.2d at 1084. Specifically, the court stated:
[I]n toxic-tort litigation, a scientific theory of causation that has not yet
reached general acceptance may be found to be sufficiently reliable if it
is based on a sound, adequately-founded scientific methodology involving data and information of the type reasonably relied on by experts in
the scientific field. The evidence of such scientific knowledge must be
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tice pointed out that under the Rubanick formulation, the admissibility of scientific evidence depends upon the soundness of the
expert's reasoning and methodology.' 3 When determining admissibility, the Landrigan court warned, trial judges should not use
their own judgment regarding the logic of the expert's conclusion. 13 Rather, Justice Pollock emphasized, the threshold inquiry
is whether a comparable expert would approve the methodology.' 3 5 The court indicated that the trial judge must function as a
critical observer, capable of distinguishing a credible scientific the" 1 36
ory from self-validating "junk science.
After setting forth the governing standard, Justice Pollock explained the issue of causation in toxic tort litigation and the role of
epidemiology therein.1 37 The nature of the injury in a toxic tort
case, the justice stressed, renders traditional methods of cause-andeffect proof inoperative.13 Justice Pollock observed that, as a result, plaintiffs must rely on more general evidence, i.e., statistical
inferences of the kind produced by epidemiological research." 9
The court noted, however, that the mere existence of a statistical
correlation is not enough to establish causation."
Rather, the
court proposed, a statistical association must14rise to a certain level
to be accepted as proof of a causal relation.
proffered by an expert who is sufficiently qualified by education, knowledge, training, and experience in the specific field of science. The expert must possess a demonstrated professional capability to assess the
scientific significance of the underlying data and information, to apply
the scientific methodology, and to explain the bases for the opinion.
Id. (citing Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 125 N.J. 421, 449, 593 A.2d 733, 747-48
(1991)).
Justice Pollock noted that the appellate division had handed down its opinion in
Landriganbefore the supreme court had decided Rubanick Id.
'33 Id. at 414, 605 A.2d at 1084 (citing Rubanick, 125 N.J. at 449, 605 A.2d at 747-48)
(stating that "Rubanick changed the emphasis for the admission of expert testimony
from general acceptance in the scientific community to the methodology and reasoning supporting the testimony").
134 Id. at 414, 421, 605 A.2d at 1084, 1088.
'35 Id. at 421, 605 A.2d at 1088.
136 Id. at 414, 605 A.2d at 1084 (citations omitted). For a general discussion of the
term "junk science" and the abuse of expert testimony, see Epstein & Klein, supra
note 3, at 656-64.
'37 Landfigan, 127 N.J. at 415, 605 A.2d at 1085.
138 Id.
139 Id. The court defined epidemiology as the study of the "relationship between a
disease and a factor suspected of causing the disease, using statistical methods to determine the likelihood of causation." Id. (citing Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 6, at
750).
140 Id.
141 Id. (quoting GARY D. FRIEDMAN, PRIMER OF EPIDEMIOLOGY at 182-83 (3d ed.
1987)) ("[S]tatistical associations do not necessarily imply causation.... It is impor-
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Recognizing that the trial judge is no more equipped than the
average juror to assess the strength of a statistical association, the
Landrigancourt provided a means of evaluating whether epidemiological evidence meets the standard of admissibility.1 4 At a Rule 8
hearing, Justice Pollock advised, an expert must present the facts
underlying his conclusion, explain the methodology utilized in arriving at that conclusion and prove that both the facts and the
methodology are reliable. 4 ' Thejustice suggested that trial judges
personally review the epidemiological studies relied on by experts.'
Finally, Justice Pollock counseled, guidance could also be
obtained by weighing the extent of the witness' expertise. 145 The
tant, therefore, to have some basis for deciding whether a statistical association derived from an observational study represents a cause-and-effect relationship"). The
Landrigan court agreed with defendants' assertion that one must consider the
strength of a statistical association and the consistency with other scientific findings.
Id. at 416, 605 A.2d at 1085. The court, however, disagreed with the defendants'
contention that epidemiological evidence must demonstrate an attributable risk of
fifty percent and a relative risk higher than 2.0 to form a reliable basis for expert
testimony. Id. at 419, 605 A.2d at 1087. In rejecting the argument, Justice Pollock
pointed out that
under certain circumstances a study with a relative risk of less than 2.0
could support a finding of specific causation. Those circumstances
would include, for example, individual clinical data, such as asbestos in
or near the tumor or a documented history of extensive asbestos exposure. So viewed, a relative risk of 2.0 is not so much a password to finding causation as one piece of evidence, among others, for the court to
consider in determining whether the expert has employed a sound
methodology in reaching his or her conclusion.
Id. See supra note 11 (discussing epidemiological terminology, including the significance of an attributable risk factor).
Until recently, commentators have generally noted that an attributable risk must
exceed fifty percent to be of any value in proving causation. Black & Lilienfeld, supra
note 6, at 767. The appellate division's ruling in Landrigan adopted this position.
Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 243 N.J. Super. 449, 459, 579 A.2d 1268, 1272 (App. Div.
1990) (declaring that a relative risk factor of 1.5 and an attributable risk factor of
thirty-five percent was not sufficient to establish causation). According to the New
Jersey Appellate Division, epidemiological evidence is admissible on its own merit
only if the evidence is supported by a high risk ratio. Grassis v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
248 N.J. Super. 446, 456, 591 A.2d 671, 676 (App. Div. 1991). Epidemiological evidence which does not reach this threshold can be used only in conjunction with more
particularized evidence. Id.
142 Landrigan, 127 N.J. at 417-21, 605 A.2d at 1086-88.
143 Id. at 417, 605 A.2d at 1086. The Landrigancourt suggested that the proposed
method of evaluating testimony will help the trial judge determine whether expert
testimony assists the jury in comprehending the evidence and deciding issues of fact.
Id. See supra note 28 for the text of Rule 8.
144 Landrigan, 127 N.J. at 417, 605 A.2d at 1086. Justice Pollock listed other sources
that a trial judge may consult when evaluating reliability, including texts, professional
journals, symposia, conferences, recognized professional societies and other judicial
opinions. Id. (citing State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 210-11, 478 A.2d 364, 380 (1984)).
145 Id. (citation omitted).
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court concluded that when the above requirements are met, a
plaintiff may properly rely upon epidemiological studies, presented
in concert with other more particularized evidence, to establish
causation.

146

. Justice Pollock then focused on the testimony of the two experts in the case at bar.14 7 Analyzing Dr. Sokolowski's methodology, Justice Pollock explained that the doctor's strategy involved
balancing the decedent's exposure against the absence of other
risk factors.' 4 8 After outlining the specifics of Dr. Sokolowski's reasoning process, the court detailed certain guidelines for the trial
court to follow on remand. 149 Justice Pollock suggested that the
trial court review the validity of the epidemiological studies upon
which the doctor based his conclusion. 15 0 The justice further recommended that the trial court determine if other members of the
scientific community approved of Dr. Sokolowski's reasoning.' 5 '
In contrast to the treatment of Dr. Sokolowski's testimony, the
court quickly resolved the controversy surrounding Dr. Wagoner's
testimony. 1 52 Justice Pollock explained that the Rubanick decision
stands for the proposition that an otherwise qualified "non-physician" can proffer evidence of causation within the context of toxic
tort litigation.'" The court, therefore, declared that on remand,
Dr. Wagoner's testimony should be admitted into evidence, pro146

Id. at 417-18, 605 A.2d at 1086.

147 Id. at 418, 605 A.2d at 1086.
148 Id. at 420, 605 A.2d at 1087-88. The court noted that Dr. Sokolowski based his
opinion, in part, on an epidemiological study which suggested that thirty-five percent
of colon cancer patients who suffer sustained exposure to asbestos contracted the
cancer as a result of that exposure. Id. at 418, 605 A.2d at 1086. Next, the court
observed, Dr. Sokolowski evaluated the decedent's medical history, an endeavor
which enabled him to eliminate other risk factors, including a familial predisposition
to colon cancer and consumption of fat-enriched foods or excessive alcohol. Id. at
418, 420, 605 A.2d at 1086, 1087-88.
149 Id. at 420-21, 605 A.2d at 1088.
150 Id. at 420, 605 A.2d at 1088. Thejustice then advised the trial court to ascertain
whether the decedent's level of exposure was comparable to that of the study group.
Id. The court indicated that the trial judge should "also verify Dr. Sokolowski's assumption concerning the absence of other risk factors." Id. at 420-21, 605 A.2d at
1088.
151 Id. at 421, 605 A.2d at 1088.
152 See id. at 421-22, 605 A.2d at 1088-89.
153 Id., 605 A.2d at 1088 (citing Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 125 N.J. 421,
593 A.2d 733 (1991)). In Rubanick, Justice Pollock explained, the court allowed a
biochemist who was not a physician, to testify that exposure to PCBs caused the plaintiff's colon cancer. Id. at 421, 605 A.2d at 1088 (citing Rubanick, 125 N.J. at 452, 593
A.2d at 749). Apparently, the court stated, even the Landnigan defendants acknowledged that Rubanick permits an otherwise qualified non-physician to testify as to causation. Id.
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vided it meets the same requirements as Dr. Sokolowski's.1 4
Subsequently, the supreme court ruled that the epidemiological evidence relied upon by the two experts could be used to establish causation if the applicable standards of admissibility were
met.155 After analyzing the standards applied by the trial court, the
Landrigan court articulated that the trial judge should have evaluated only the soundness of Dr. Sokolowski's methodology and
should not have barred Dr. Wagoner's testimony about causation
simply because he was not a medical doctor.1 5 6 In remanding the
matter, the court emphasized that the trial judge could reach the
same result as the appellate division after appraising the testimony
in light of the court's holding. 57
The admissibility of scientific evidence in toxic tort litigation
presents one of the many challenges of modern jurisprudence. 5 8
When a supreme judicial body inevitably addresses this evidentiary
issue,159 the court must fashion a policy that favors either the plainId. at 422, 605 A.2d at 1088-89. Justice Pollock noted that other jurisdictions
permit an otherwise qualified non-physician to testify as to causation. Id. at 423, 605
A.2d at 1089 (citing In re Paoli R.IR Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829, 855-56 (3d Cir.
1990) (allowing testimony from toxicologist, microbiologist and physicist); Valiulis v.
Scheffels, 547 N.E.2d 1289, 1296-97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (permitting a clinical psychologist/neuropsychologist to testify); Loudermill v. Dow Chemical Co., 863 F.2d 566,
570 (8th Cir. 1988) (allowing testimony from a toxicologist); Karasik v. Bird, 470
N.Y.S.2d 605, 608 (1984) (allowing testimony from a pharmacologist); Nicholas v. City
of Alton, 437 N.E.2d 757, 760 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (permitting a toxicologist/biochemist to testify); Roberts v. United States, 316 F.2d 489, 492-93 (3d Cir. 1963) (allowing testimony from industrial hygenist and toxicologist)).
155 Id. at 417-18, 605 A.2d at 1086.
156 Id. at 420, 422, 605 A.2d at 1088, 1088-89.
157 Id. at 422, 605 A.2d at 1088. The justice stressed that the application of statistical inferences is essential in toxic tort litigation. Id. The justice, however, cautioned
that statistical evidence must nonetheless meet the reasonableness standard to earn
admission. Id. This important determination, Justice Pollock concluded, rests with
the trial judge. Id.
158 See Gold, supra note 4, at 376.
159 The NewJersey Supreme Court was ahead of many courts in reaching this issue.
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has only recently addressed the admissibility of expert testimony. Acting in its capacity as final interpreter of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, the Supreme Court in Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticalsrejected the
Frye standard, holding instead that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 enunciates the
threshold for admitting scientific testimony in the federal courts. Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 92-102, 1993 WL 224478, at *4 (U.S. June 28, 1993).
In Dauber4 the plaintiffs, two minor children and their parents, filed suit against
Merrell Dow, alleging that the mothers' ingestion of Bendectin while pregnant had
resulted in serious birth defects to the children. Id. at *2. In opposition to Merrell
Dow's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs proffered the testimony of eight
impressively-credentialed experts, each of whom concluded that Bendectin can cause
birth defects. Id.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of California nonethe154
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less granted Merrell Dow's motion, holding that the experts' opinions, based as they
were upon animal studies, chemical structure analyses, and the unpublished "reanalysis" of previously published epidemiological studies, did not meet the standard of
general acceptance. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570
(S.D. Cal. 1989). Citing Frye, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir.
1991). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to reconcile the sharply divergent positions of the federal circuits regarding the appropriate standard for admission of scientific testimony. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct.
320 (1992). Reversing the decisions of the lower courts and remanding the matter
for further proceedings in accordance with its opinion, the Supreme Court held that
adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 superceded the Fiye standard. Daubert 1993
WL 224478, at *4. The Court further held that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 imposes
two requirements on expert scientific testimony: (1) that the testimony pertain to
scientific knowledge; and (2) that the testimony assist the trier of fact to understand
or determine a fact in issue. Id. at *5-6.
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun began by diffusing the importance of
Fry& Id. at *4. The Justice stated that the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence superceded Frye. Id. The Court further noted that neither the text nor the
drafting history of the rules indicate an assimilation of the general acceptance standard. Id. In fact, the Court observed that the rigidity of the Frye standard runs contrary to the liberal underpinnings of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. According to
the majority, Federal Rule of Evidence 402 captures the essence of this liberal thrust
"All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution
of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed
by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority." Id. (quoting FED. R. Evm.
402). The majority proposed that the limitations of the general acceptance standard
contradict the liberal approach codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. The
Court, therefore, expressly rejected Frye as the standard for admitting scientific testimony. Id. at *5.
After determining which standard governs the admission of expert testimony, the
Court next set forth the requirements of that standard. Id. at *5-6. According to the
Court, a trial judge must make a two-part rule 104(a) determination. Id. at *6. The
Court stated that the judge must make certain that the expert's proposed testimony
(1) relates to scientific knowledge, and (2) will assist the trier of fact to determine a
fact in issue. Id. Justice Blackmun explained that scientific knowledge requires "a
grounding in the methods and procedures of science." Id. at *5. The Justice further
expounded that scientific knowledge suggests more than unfounded speculation. Id.
Noting that scientific certainty is neither expected nor required, the majority concluded that an inference or assertion can qualify as scientific knowledge if it is
reached by a scientific method, if it is supported by appropriate validation, and if it is
based on known facts. Id.
The Court emphasized, however, that scientific knowledge is not admissible unless it has a logical connection to a fact in issue. Id. at *5-6. The majority essentially
reiterated the language of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which provides that expert
testimony must "assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue." Id.
at *5. The Court labelled this requirement as one of relevancy. Id. The Court explained that scientific knowledge must bear relevantly on a pertinent inquiry in order
to be admissible. Id. at *6.
After articulating the two-part inquiry embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
Justice Blackmun next provided a list of four factors intended to help the trial judge
assess the scientific validity of the reasoning and methodology underlying an expert's
testimony. Id. at *6-7. The Justice interjected, however, that the list of factors is
neither exhaustive nor dispositive. Id. at *6. The majority suggested that the trial
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tiff or the defendant. 6 The standard enunciated by the court in
judge consider: (1) whether a scientific theory can be tested; (2) whether a theory
has been subjected to peer review and/or publication; (3) whether a particular theory
has a known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether a theory has attained a degree
of acceptance in the scientific community. Id. at *6-7. The Court cautioned that because the Federal Rules of Evidence advocate a flexible approach, these factors must
be applied to the principles and methodology employed by an expert, not to the
expert's ultimate conclusion. Id. at *7.
In closing, the Court further advised that a trial judge may take guidance from
three other sources. Id. The Court reminded the trial judge of the reasonable reliability standard embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 703. Id. The majority also
advocated calling an expert of the trial court's own choosing pursuant to Federal Rule
of Evidence 706. Id. Finally, the majority recalled a trial court's right under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403 to exclude relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice or confusion. Id. Thus, with confidence in the judicial system's ability to distinguish admissible from inadmissible evidence, the Court rejected the long-standing Frye test in favor
of the more liberal approach of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at *7-8.
ChiefJustice Rehnquist filed a separate opinion, in which Justice Stevens joined,
concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at *10 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). ChiefJustice Rehnquist agreed that Frye was superceded
by the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. The Chief Justice disagreed,
however, with the majority's decision to provide the trial judge with a list of factors to
help inform his or her determination. Id. at *11-12 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed concern that such
observations, offered as they were in the abstract, tend to complicate, not simplify,
difficult legal questions. Id. at *11 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). The Chief Justice contended that the majority had created more questions
than it had answered. Id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist, therefore, believed that the majority should have limited its opinion to the issues of the case and avoided further interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 until such time as it was required. Id. at *12
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
160 The Agent Orange court explained:
Courts have adopted two general approaches to Rule 703: one restrictive, one liberal. The more restrictive view requires the trial court to
determine not only whether the data are of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the field, but also whether the underlying data are
untrustworthy for hearsay or other reasons. The more liberal view,....
allows the expert to base an opinion on data of the type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the field without separately determining the
trustworthiness of the particular data involved.
In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1243-44 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), aftid, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Lombardi v. Dow Chemical Go., 487 U.S. 1234 (1988) (citations omitted).
An approach that favors the defendant appears to have two primary characteristics. First, the "pro-defendant" approach will likely adopt the general acceptance standard. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (pronouncing the
general acceptance standard); Moenssens, supra note 75, at 545 (stating that some
courts regard the Fye standard as an obstacle to the admission of evidence that is
based on new scientific theories). The general acceptance standard precludes the
introduction of expert testimony which is not approved by a substantial proportion of
the scientific community. See Giannelli, supranote 75, at 1210-11. Giannelli further
explained:
The percentage of those in the field who must accept the technique has
never been clearly delineated. Most courts applying Fye have not ad-
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Landrigan represents New Jersey's attempt to fashion a "pro-plaintiff" approach. 6 ' The Landrigan court's decision has merit. Because the nature of science is such that there will never be a
majority of experts advocating the same theory, there is no question that the toxic tort plaintiff faces the near impossible when
asked to prove a generally accepted theory of causation. For example, the media constantly bombards the public with news of studies
on the possible environmental and dietary causes of various cancers, only to report a short time later contradictory medical findings. If the general acceptance standard were to remain in effect,
then legitimately harmed plaintiffs would often be unable to recover damages.
An additional benefit of the Landrigan standard is that it provides the trial judge with guidelines for assessing reasonable reliability.'" I Just as opposing attorneys can arrive at differing yet sound
conclusions when analyzing the same legal principle, so too may
experts reach discordant opinions when evaluating the same data.
In that situation, the judge need only concern himself with the reliability of the expert's methodology.' 6 3 To that end, the Landrigan
dressed the issue adequately; they have either ignored it altogether or
offered rather general statements. For example, one court has defined
general acceptance as "widespread; prevalent; extensive though not universal." Another court has conceded that "a degree of scientific divergence of view is inevitable," without elaborating on how much
divergence would be dispositive.
Id. (quoting United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 688 (D. D.C.), rev'd, 475 F.2d
1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 327 N.E.2d 671, 678 n.6 (Mass.
1975)). In the ever-expanding area of cancer research, for example, it is highly unlikely that one theory of causation will ever earn the universal acceptance of the medical establishment. Thus, the general acceptance standard may leave the proponent of
a toxic tort claim with little or no means of establishing proximate cause.
The "pro-defendant" position is further characterized by a manifest lack of confidence in the concept of the objective jury. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying
text (discussing Fryeand the application of the general acceptance standard). Particularly, the general acceptance theory undervalues ajury's ability to distinguish reliable
from unreliable testimony and places the decision in the hands of the judge. See
Moenssens, supra note 75, at 545. Once the judge determines that evidence is unreliable according to the requirements of general acceptance, the jury is barred from placing any value of its own on the testimony. Id.
An approach that favors the plaintiff, on the other hand, seeks to limit the trial
judge's veto power and reduces the emphasis on what percentage of the scientific
community supports the expert's opinion. See supra notes 43-51, 58-73 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations that the liberal approach to admissibility places
on the trial judge).
161 See Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 127 N.J. 404, 605 A.2d 1079 (1992).
162 See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text (outlining the judicial guidelines
established by the Landrigancourt).
163 Landrigan, 127 N.J. at 422, 605 A.2d at 1088-89.
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court even refers the judge to certain sources which may enlighten
his decision."
Unfortunately, the Landrigan standard will not achieve its essential goal of clarifying the admission process and limiting the
judge's role therein because much of the determination is still left
to the judge's discretion.' 6 5 Ajudge has the authority to review all
the steps that lead to an expert's conclusion. 66 He may examine
the plaintiffs medical profile, the studies the expert relied on and
any applicable literature in the area of expertise. 167 Although the
judge may not substitute his own conclusion for that of the expert,
the judge is required to assess the reasonableness of the expert's
methodology. 68 The Landriganstandard provides only guidelines
and no brightline test for making that determination. Thus, a
judge's ruling on admissibility will stand unless the plaintiff can
prove on appeal that it is plain error or that the judge abused his
discretion.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling in Landrigan clearly
liberalizes the requirements for the admission of scientific testimony in toxic tort litigation. On its face, the ruling appears to
make it easier for plaintiffs to meet their burden of proving causation, but in reality defendants may benefit as well. 169 A defendant
164 See id. at 417, 605 A.2d at 1086. Such sources included professional journals,
text books, symposia and other judicial opinions. Id.
165 See id. at 420-21, 605 A.2d at 1087-88.
166 See id.
167 See id.
168 See id. at 414, 605 A.2d at 1084.
169 See Dafler v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 259 N.J. Super. 17, 36, 611 A.2d 136, 146
(1992). Landrigan and its companion case, Caterinicchiov. PittsburghComing Go., were
relied upon by the appellate division to formulate its holding in Dafter. Id.; see supra
note 16 (discussing the Caternicchiocase). In Dafter, the plaintiff claimed that he had
developed lung cancer and asbestosis as a result of a six year occupational exposure to
asbestos. Dafter, 259 N.J. Super. at 21, 611 A.2d at 138. Plaintiff, however, admitted
that he had also smoked one pack of cigarettes every day for forty-five years. Id. at 25,
611 A.2d at 140. At trial, the plaintiff presented two expert witnesses who testified that
the plaintiffs lung cancer had been induced by exposure to asbestos, but acknowledged that cigarette smoking is presently the single greatest cause of lung cancer in
the United States. Id. at 25-26, 611 A.2d at 140. The plaintiffs experts based their
conclusions upon epidemiological studies, which linked asbestos exposure to lung
cancer. Id. at 25, 611 A.2d at 140. The defendant's expert also relied upon epidemiological data which established the strong causal connection between lung cancer and
cigarette smoking. Id. at 25-26, 611 A.2d at 140-41. The jury returned a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff for liability and damages. Id. at 21, 611 A.2d at 138. The jury,
however, found that plaintiffs lung cancer was seventy percent attributable to cigarette smoking. Id. at 21, 26-27, 611 A.2d at 138, 141. The plaintiff appealed contending that the evidence did not provide the jury with a reasonable basis for
apportionment. Id. at 22, 611 A.2d at 138.
The appellate division endorsed the position of § 433A of the Restatement (Sec-
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may seek to introduce epidemiological evidence, either to contradict that of the plaintiff or to prove that another causative agent
present in plaintiff's environment had a comparable or even
greater statistical correlation to the plaintiff's condition.""0 Because the courts have already demonstrated a willingness to apply
the Landrigan holding in this way, its effect may not be entirely
"pro-plaintiff."""
ChristineM. Gurry
ond) of Torts on apportionment. Id. at 28, 611 A.2d at 141. Section 433A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: "(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes where (a) there are distinct harms, or (b) there is a
reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm. (2)
Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or more causes."
RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 433A (1966). Relying upon § 433A, the appellate
division affirmed the verdict, stating that the 70/30 split between smoking and asbestos on causation was in line with statistical associations revealed by epidemiological
research. Dafter, 259 N.J. Super. at 28-29, 35-36, 611 A.2d at 141-42, 145-46. The court,
therefore, held that a reasonable basis for determining apportionment did exist. Id.
at 35, 611 A.2d at 145. This ruling effectively permitted toxic tort defendants to employ the Landiganstandard in order to balance the scales which Landriganitself had
tipped in favor of the plaintiff. Roy Alan Cohen & Frank Fazio, SharingDamages in
Multiparty Toxic Tort Cases, 132 N.J.L.J. 370, 390 (October 19, 1992). In other words, if
plaintiffs can use epidemiological evidence to establish causation, defendants can use
it to refute causation or, at the very least, apportion it among other causative agents.
Id.
170 SeeDafter, 259 N.J. Super. at 36, 611 A.2d at 146.
171 See id. See also Cohen & Fazio, supranote 169, at 390. Cohen and Fazio observed:
With the Appellate Division's decision in Dafter, the trend continues toward submitting scientific and epidemiologic evidence to the jury as a
factor to be considered in deciding issues of causation. Certainly, the
New Jersey Supreme Court's decisions in Landrigan and Caterinicchio
represent that approach from the plaintiffs standpoint, and the Appellate Division decision in Dafter serves to support this trend from the defense standpoint.

